Re: Classified NSA ciphers

On Sep 8, 12:59 pm, g...@xxxxxxxxxxxxx (Greg Rose) wrote:
In article <8ae030ed-1397-44ae-9b3a-7c1da1308...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
Tom St Denis  <t...@xxxxxxx> wrote:

On Sep 7, 10:47 pm, biject <biject.b...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hey!   Imbecile!

AES was designed by two Belgians.

 If the NSA did not bless it. It would never be. But I suspect
that level of thought processing is a little beyond your grasp
of reality.

I like how your version of reality is more plausible in your mind.
Despite the fact that AES was an open process, and the final selection
was down to an OPEN VOTE from the public ... yes, it's totally obvious
now that AES was designed by NSA agents and the vote was all but a
masquerade.  Clearly, that's what happened.  Because you of course
have proof of this.... right?

As a minor nit, I will point out that when the
vote was taken at the final AES conference, Brian
Snow (NIST) was careful to remind everyone that it
was non-binding and NIST was going to do whatever
they wanted... which turned out to be Rijndael
anyway.

Fair enough, but I think there might have been an outcry if they
instead proposed a 6th cipher at the last minute [or altered
Rijndael]. At the time people had a tendency [and sadly in Asia still
do] to roll their own ciphers. Blowfish was gaining ground in
protocols like SSH and CAST5 in GPG for that very reason. So even if
an unfavourable cipher was chosen it might not have been that
controversial in effect.

Also, it was the public process that weeded out the 15 or so initial
ciphers down to the 5 ideal candidates. All I wanted to point out is
that the filtering process was predominantly open to the public.

Tom
.

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