Re: Consolidating to Date.
- From: adacrypt <austin.obyrne@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2010 14:53:55 -0700 (PDT)
On Mar 20, 7:14 pm, biject <biject.b...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Mar 18, 2:51 am, adacrypt <austin.oby...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Here is an encryption method I pointed out years ago. It
sounds a lot like your idea. But of course I think my idea
better and yet its no way close to as secure as a one time
pad or the OTP.
It is updated since I have more respect for unicity distance
than I did a decade ago. And know I have a bijective
BWT so have to use it for unicity distance stretching.
Have Alice and Bob agree on some common file that is
secretly known only to them.
Sounds like yours so far?
Alice uses the common secret file by first doing a ARB255
on it. followed BWTS on result.
She then does the same for the secrect message. She
does ARB255 followed by a pass of BWTS.
at this point the two files should be different. My XOR
code returns an empty file. if they are exactly the same
so lets never have the common secret file the same as
secret message they should not be hard. If it is to hard
I have another XOR method that is bijective that never
returns a null file will post it someday.
When Bob gets the message he uses the common file
which is either in correct form or he does a ARB255
pass followed by the BWTS. He XORs that with the
file that Alice sent. This is the new common file
to be used in messages as is. And the message is found
from this file by doing an UNBWTS followed by a
Simple compared to yours and uses lower bandwidth.
Its not unbreakable any more than yours is but from
what little you say about your method. I would say
this is better.
Other than the common secret file which is changed
ever time a message is sent there is no other key.
Yet there is an effective key based on the entropy
in the secret message. Which is different each time
and based on the high and low registers used in the
If the secret message is shorter than the common
file at the time the key space is a function of the
common file. If the secret message is very long
compared to the common file. There is a point
where the 64 high and 64 low state registers
if known exactly along with carry count. Could
if used give you part of the trailing part of the
BWTS portion of the secret message. How ever
the rest of file is lost unless the common message
is recovered. And even the last 75% of a file is not
going to help very much if its after a BWTS,
David A. Scott
My Crypto codehttp://bijective.dogma.net/crypto/scott19u.ziphttp://www..jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zipold version
My Compression codehttp://bijective.dogma.net/
**TO EMAIL ME drop the roman "five" **
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged.
As a famous person once said "any cryptograhic
system is only as strong as its weakest link"
From a distance I find it too difficult to follow your algorithm butcan I say that my counterpart to the 'common file' you mention is in
my case two (truly) random keysets that are each made (ad hoc) so as
to be the same length as the message. It is these that comprise the
mutual database that Alice is forever scarmbling. Just one key set is
ample to qualify for TU according to the "Handbook of Applied
Cryptography" but my cipher algorithm uses two. The keysets are each
comprised of a possible max of 14250 elements. This is only the
encryption template half of the eventual larger crypto scheme and you
can see already that the key permutation space is both enormous as
well as being random.
The real strength of my scalar ciphers (separate from the vector based
ones) is in the ciphertext that is separately composed of the
congruence classes of numbers in modular arithmetic that are a
function of the two keysets - This happens during the encryption
transformation - The theory is all spelled out very expansively on my
website if you want to check it out - http://www.scalarcryptography.co.uk
- it is quite difficult to understand initially - the outcome is a
large set of totally disparate integers as ciphertext that studiously
have zero structure i.e. each one is a complete discontinuity - a
single point on a separate unique line that cannot be identified and
therefore cannot be cryptanalysed by any means - Regards - adacrypt
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