Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
- From: Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2009 17:44:28 +0100
Tom St Denis wrote:
Third, related keys implies an attacker can observe traffic with keys
that are related. Explain to me how AES is used normally that would
make it vulnerable to related key attacks. That's the point of my
question. Do you even know how ciphers are used today? How can you
suggest "fixes" to things you don't even get how they work anyways?
(and thus the useless cycle of MKS replies is continued...)
That the scenario assumed by the authors of the particular paper cited
is fairly unrealistic, is admitted by the authors themselves. My
critique is that there is 'another' way of seeing that the effort is
futile, because, even assuming they could under their assumed favourable
condition get a key, if each key encrypts only one block, then the cost
in getting the key is not economically justifiable for the return is
too little. This consideration applies evidently to other attempts of
obtaining encryption keys. If an algorithm is so safe that no attacks
can ever succeed, then using one single key (for ever) is certainly
prefectly o.k. But, assuming that there is a certain probability of
some attacker's success, using a single key would mean that then the
whole message is revealed. If dynamic keys are used, the attacker has
to work out all the different keys being used. If there are n keys
used, he has to do n times as much work. That's an essential difference
that could evidently be decisive in practice for his success or failure
in decrypting the message. This should be trivially evident.
M. K. Shen
.
- References:
- A link to attempt of an attack on AES
- From: Mok-Kong Shen
- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
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- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
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- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
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- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
- From: Tom St Denis
- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
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- Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES
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