Re: A link to attempt of an attack on AES



On Nov 16, 10:58 am, Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.s...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:

http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/374.pdf

is a paper by A. Biryukov et al., entitled 'Key recovery attacks of
practical complexity on AES variants with up to 10 rounds'.

In my 2nd post (15.11.2009) in the thread "Dynamic change of encryption
keys" I argue that in my understanding such attacks, ingenious as they
are, could nevertheless never be practically effective, if one can
tolerate some additional processing cost and employs dynamic keys
instead of using a single key to process a message. You are sincerely
invited to give your comments and critiques there, if any.

We already had a past discussion about this when the attack was
published. It was commonly understood that the attack does not apply
to how most people use AES since related [chosen ones at that] keys
are not practical, that any tampering with the stream would be
identified and the session terminated.

So the attack, while noteworthy and interesting isn't really a threat.

Also, it's not polite to start multiple threads all over USENET when
you're not getting the attention you think you deserve. People don't
reply to you because, well quite frankly, you're annoying and prone to
long drawn out discussions that involve no intellectual effort on your
part. There is little reward in others trying to share wisdom or
knowledge with you since you're impervious to new ideas or
information. If you want people to pay attention to you, reward their
effort and good will with a little professionalism.

Tom
.