Re: ECB-Counter AES mode
- From: Mark Wooding <mdw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 12:32:53 +0000 (UTC)
Karl Malbrain <malbrain@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Yes, taking a sequential counter and encrypting it (e.g. CTR mode) then
encrypting the CTR mode result would avoid the problems with plain-old CTR
mode.
Huh? What problems with plain-old CTR mode? CTR mode is IND-CPA with a
secure PRP. The only problems I know of are chosen-ciphertext attacks
and lack of plaintext integrity. These problems have the same solution:
authenticate the ciphertext.
Re-encrypting the CTR-mode output provides a minimal level of protection
in the case where you're sufficiently stupid to reuse a counter value.
-- [mdw]
.
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