Re: ECB-Counter AES mode
- From: Mark Wooding <mdw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 29 Nov 2008 10:54:26 +0000 (UTC)
Karl Malbrain <malbrain@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Is there an obvious weakness I'm overlooking in empressing a
sequential counter value over the plain text block with XOR prior to
AES encryption and removing the counter value after AES decryption?
Yes. A message consisting of two blocks which differ only in the least
significant bit has probability 1/2 of encrypting to two equal
ciphertext blocks with a uniformly distributed initial counter. If the
initial counter isn't uniformly distributed, one can improve on this.
On the other hand, if you encrypt the counter and XOR it with the
plaintext, you get counter mode which is provably secure.
-- [mdw]
.
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- ECB-Counter AES mode
- From: Karl Malbrain
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