Re: ECB-Counter AES mode
- From: Ilmari Karonen <usenet2@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 29 Nov 2008 10:10:38 GMT
On 2008-11-28, Karl Malbrain <malbrain@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Is there an obvious weakness I'm overlooking in empressing a sequential
counter value over the plain text block with XOR prior to AES encryption and
removing the counter value after AES decryption?
Others have already noted that this may still leak information if the
plaintext blocks happen to contain an arithmetic progression.
However, the question I'd like to ask is: if your application allows
you to do
ciphertext = AES(plaintext XOR counter; key),
why can't you instead do
ciphertext = plaintext XOR AES(counter; key)?
Then you'd be using a standard block cipher mode (CTR) with well
established security properties.
--
Ilmari Karonen
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