Re: A twist on OTP for an outstandingly secure channel?

On 10 Jan 2007 06:49:05 -0800, "Jean-François Michaud"
<cometaj@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

I strongly disagree. And I just learnt recently that the idea of
standard OTP is enhanced to even deny attackers of knowledge of a
signal by having high security requirement U.S. embassies feeding a
continuous stream of RNG keys across the channel, even when no message
needs to be sent. This invalidates your idea that OTP by itself 'is'
black and that there is no place for improvement. This does by no mean
imply that my idea is correct, but it does imply that you are incorrect
in thinking that there is no place for improvement. Why do you think
embassies would possibly bother with such a 'useless' scheme, if OTPs
are already 'unbreakable'?

Keeping a secure line filled with spurious traffic does nothing to
make the cypher used more unbreakable. What it does is to prevent
traffic analysis on the line: how much was sent and when it was sent.
See for more details.


The answer is, it extends the 'complexity-of-unbreakability' of the

Read and learn.

Jean-Francois Michaud