Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept
- From: daw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (David Wagner)
- Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2006 22:33:06 +0000 (UTC)
Mpilot wrote:
If you look at Fig. 4.3. in which the Gaussian Wiretap Channel with
Side Information is given, [...]
I haven't looked at anything not posted on sci.crypt, but my
understanding is that the Gaussian Wiretap Channel assumes noisy
channels, and is not applicable if all channels are noiseless (as
is the case for Internet communications, for these purposes). Feel
free to correct me if I misunderstood.
Why don't you post here a concise list of your assumptions, your
threat model, and your security goals? Then perhaps you could post
here a summary of your scheme to achieve those security goals, under
that threat model, given those assumptions.
P.S. If you can't explain this in a way that Kristian can understand,
I'd take that as an indication that there is probably a problem either
in your presentation or in your scheme.
.
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