sci.crypt

• Date Index

• Encryption - How to Choose Password, Stephen
• Enigma-like cipher: variable rotor stepping, DarkProtoman
  • Re: Enigma-like cipher: variable rotor stepping, Jean-François Michaud
    • Re: Enigma-like cipher: variable rotor stepping, DarkProtoman
• KRYPTOS-3 transposition method, r.e.s.
  • Re: KRYPTOS-3 transposition method, Ignacio aecbi
  • Re: KRYPTOS-3 transposition method, r.e.s.
    • Re: KRYPTOS-3 transposition method, r.e.s.
• Vegas Vault - A New Encryption Program, Ken_11010111
  • Re: Vegas Vault - A New Encryption Program, tomstdenis
• OT: Microsoft does it again?!, John E. Hadstate
  • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, Carlos Moreno
    • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, John E. Hadstate
      • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, clark
      • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, Carlos Moreno
  • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, clark
  • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, Mike Amling
    • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, John E. Hadstate
      • Re: OT: Microsoft does it again?!, David Wagner
• The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept (second attempt), Juuso Hukkanen
• Re: Internet Security Warning!, framarks
  • Re: Internet Security Warning!, nemo_outis
  • Re: Internet Security Warning!, nemo_outis
• Testing XTEA, Mike Simpson
  • Re: Testing XTEA, tomstdenis
    • Re: Testing XTEA, Mike Simpson
    • Re: Testing XTEA, Wolfgang Ehrhardt
      • Re: Testing XTEA, tomstdenis
      • Re: Testing XTEA, Mike Simpson
      • Re: Testing XTEA, Mike Simpson
      • Re: Testing XTEA, Wolfgang Ehrhardt
• I'm back, news, good will and all that, tomstdenis
  • Re: I'm back, news, good will and all that, Luc The Perverse
  • Re: I'm back, news, good will and all that, David A Molnar
  • Re: I'm back, news, good will and all that, clark
  • Re: I'm back, news, good will and all that, Christophe Devine
    • Re: I'm back, news, good will and all that, tomstdenis
• Was the Abwehr Enigma-G stronger than the normal Enigma, due to the rotating reflector?, DarkProtoman
  • Re: Was the Abwehr Enigma-G stronger than the normal Enigma, due to the rotating reflector?, David Hamer
    • Re: Was the Abwehr Enigma-G stronger than the normal Enigma, due to the rotating reflector?, DarkProtoman
• RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Vincent Badier
  • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Mike Amling
    • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Vincent Badier
  • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Carlos Moreno
    • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Bryan Olson
  • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, M Jason Hinek
    • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSA question as well, following B. Schneier book example, Carlos Moreno
• Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
  • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Unruh
    • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Unruh
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Mike Amling
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Ivan Voras
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
  • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, David Eather
    • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Unruh
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Simon Johnson
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Unruh
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Ignacio aecbi
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Unruh
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Ignacio aecbi
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Ignacio aecbi
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, David Eather
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jeff Dege
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Mike Amling
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Simon Johnson
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, David Wagner
      • Re: Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jeff Dege
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Enigma machine strenght using a computer, Jean-François Michaud
• The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
  • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, David Wagner
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, David Wagner
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, David Wagner
      • Re: The operational FreeMove Quantum Exchange Proof-of-Concept, Mpilot
• OT:Peter Gutmann - Nice Article!, Timoleon
  • Re: OT:Peter Gutmann - Nice Article!, clark
• AACS hits the dust., Jan Panteltje
  • Re: AACS hits the dust., Rob Warnock
• Number theoretic functions, dcorbit
  • Re: Number theoretic functions, Tim Peters
    • Re: Number theoretic functions, user923005
      • Re: Number theoretic functions, Tim Peters
      • Re: Number theoretic functions, user923005
      • Re: Number theoretic functions, Tim Peters
      • Re: Number theoretic functions, user923005
  • Re: Number theoretic functions, stdazi@xxxxxxxxx
• and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
  • Re: and now for something completely different., Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., John Hadstate
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Valery Pryamikov
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Valery Pryamikov
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Antony Clements
      • Re: and now for something completely different., tomstdenis
      • Re: and now for something completely different., Valery Pryamikov
• truecrypt keyfile complexity question, vedaal
  • Re: truecrypt keyfile complexity question, vedaal
• Kryptos part 4., Ignacio aecbi
• Regarding acoustic echo cancellation using frequency domain LMS algorithm and subband LMS algorithm, Aparna Ram
• announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, Wei Dai
  • Re: announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, clark
    • Re: announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, Wei Dai
  • Re: announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, David Wagner
    • Re: announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, Wei Dai
      • Re: announce: the ultimate crypto homepages list, David Wagner
• [OT: Trusted Node Authentication™], MikeD - Austin, TX
  • Re: [OT: Trusted Node Authentication™], ecarl1017
    • Re: [OT: Trusted Node Authentication™], MikeD - Austin, TX
      • Re: Re: [OT: Trusted Node Authentication™], David Wagner
      • Re: [OT: Trusted Node Authentication™], MikeD - Austin, TX
  • Re: Trusted Node AuthenticationT], Harvy Resiling
    • Re: Trusted Node AuthenticationT], MikeD - Austin, TX
• clique method in differential cryptanalysis, ReZa
• What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Simon
  • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Damian 'legion' Szuberski
    • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Simon
      • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Luc The Perverse
      • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Damian 'legion' Szuberski
  • Message not available
    • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Bryan Olson
  • Re: What is the maximum length of the message for SHA-1, Amit
• Christmas Greetings, Simon Johnson
• Re: ADVERT: Secure comms, sandyinchina
• BBC links:Privacy Concerns over States/Corporations'Use of Personal Info, mashi3981@xxxxxxxxx
• Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, vaidehikedlaya
  • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, Le Chaud Lapin
    • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, vaidehikedlaya
      • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, Le Chaud Lapin
  • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, Christian Siebert
  • Re: Dividing 512 bit number by 128 bit number in C program, Phil Carmody
• Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Jeff
  • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, fortune . bruce
    • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Jeff
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Jeff
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Christophe Devine
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, clark
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Jeff
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, clark
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Christophe Devine
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, clark
      • Re: Please Help: x.509 Certificates Library or non-certificate authentication, Paul Rubin
• Do Gap-CDH groups exist?, amitabh123
  • Re: Do Gap-CDH groups exist?, Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: Do Gap-CDH groups exist?, yampolskiy
      • Re: Do Gap-CDH groups exist?, Amit
• To Beale Screamer, fiddle_flyer
• How would seriation weaken a digraphic cipher?, r.e.s.
  • How would seriation weaken a digraphic cipher?, r.e.s.
• Key-based cryptographic modes, Jeff Dege
  • Re: Key-based cryptographic modes, David Wagner
  • Re: Key-based cryptographic modes, Valery Pryamikov
  • Re: Key-based cryptographic modes, sandyinchina
• RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
  • Re: RSA Performance, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: RSA Performance, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: RSA Performance, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: RSA Performance, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: RSA Performance, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
      • Re: RSA Performance, Mike Amling
  • Re: RSA Performance, Mike Amling
    • Re: RSA Performance, Le Chaud Lapin
• Please explain in simple terms -- key collision attack, AM
  • Re: Please explain in simple terms -- key collision attack, da5id65536@xxxxxxxxx
    • Re: Please explain in simple terms -- key collision attack, Unruh
      • Re: Please explain in simple terms -- key collision attack, da5id65536@xxxxxxxxx
• Sorry, Joe, david . florman
  • Re: Sorry, Joe, Simon Johnson
    • Re: Sorry, Joe, david . florman
• Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
  • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Luc The Perverse
    • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Luc The Perverse
      • Re: I retract this. Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, vedaal
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, vedaal
    • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Andrew Swallow
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Luc The Perverse
  • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, david . florman
    • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, david . florman
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, Arthur J. O'Dwyer
      • Re: Can we all talk about the elephant in the room?, David Eather
• Decrypt messages received from different senders, Sergei
  • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, Paul Rubin
    • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, Sergei
      • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, Peter Pearson
      • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, Sergei
      • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, vedaal
  • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, rossum
  • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, Peter Fairbrother
    • Re: Decrypt messages received from different senders, amitabh123
• >-) ~-`-`- Amazing 5.5" Turd Cutter -' -'-~ (-<, google98.email@xxxxxxxxxxx
• twofish, Antony Clements
  • Re: twofish, clark
    • Re: twofish, Antony Clements
      • Re: twofish, Antony Clements
• Dig-Sig for MS Word, Tom
• Zfone security, Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: Zfone security, Simon Johnson
    • Re: Zfone security, Cactus
  • Re: Zfone security, D Jablon
    • Re: Zfone security, Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: Zfone security, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: Zfone security, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Zfone security, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: Zfone security, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: Zfone security, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: Zfone security, Paul Rubin
  • Re: Zfone security, vedaal
  • Re: Zfone security, Paul Rubin
    • Re: Zfone security, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: Zfone security, Paul Rubin
• Efficient Exponentiation of a Shared Secret, Robert
  • Re: Efficient Exponentiation of a Shared Secret, Robert
    • Re: Efficient Exponentiation of a Shared Secret, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: Efficient Exponentiation of a Shared Secret, Mike Amling
    • Re: Efficient Exponentiation of a Shared Secret, eike . kiltz
• uri geller, uri.geller.jokes@xxxxxxxxx
• Using Miracl under the Linux environment, Samson
  • Re: Using Miracl under the Linux environment, Phil Carmody
    • Re: Using Miracl under the Linux environment, Samson
• Outerbridge des.c on AIX (bigendian), Neil W.
  • Re: Outerbridge des.c on AIX (bigendian), Simon Johnson
    • Re: Outerbridge des.c on AIX (bigendian), Neil W.
• "maximum distance" of a Goppa code?, Wei Dai
  • Re: "maximum distance" of a Goppa code?, DmitryKovtun
  • Re: "maximum distance" of a Goppa code?, daniel bleichenbacher
    • Re: covering radius (was "maximum distance") of a Goppa code?, Wei Dai
      • Re: covering radius (was "maximum distance") of a Goppa code?, daniel bleichenbacher
      • Re: covering radius (was "maximum distance") of a Goppa code?, Wei Dai
• Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, bongomongo
  • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, Phil Carmody
    • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, bongomongo
      • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, Phil Carmody
  • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, Mike Scott
    • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, Mike Amling
      • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, ttw
      • Re: Elliptic curve factoring with points *NOT* on the curve, bongomongo
• Extending Goldwasser-Micali, Mike Amling
  • Re: Extending Goldwasser-Micali, David Wagner
  • Re: Extending Goldwasser-Micali, Kristian Gjøsteen
• error correcting/detecting code question, Bart Vandewoestyne
  • Re: error correcting/detecting code question, Mike Amling
  • Re: error correcting/detecting code question, Peter Pearson
  • Re: error correcting/detecting code question, jsavard
• So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Carlos Moreno
  • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Bruce Stephens
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Felix Rawlings
  • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Mike Amling
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, BenL
  • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Christophe Devine
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Wei Dai
  • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Peter Pearson
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, BenL
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Peter Pearson
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Peter Pearson
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Bodo Moeller
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Thomas Pornin
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Mike Amling
      • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Paul Rubin
    • Re: So, what is it about OpenSSL and sci.crypt?, Douglas A. Gwyn
• crypto challenge, amitabh123
  • Re: crypto challenge, Robert
    • Re: crypto challenge, amitabh123
    • Re: crypto challenge, Amit
• 2006/467 Chang Yung: silly?, D. J. Bernstein
  • Re: 2006/467 Chang Yung: silly?, Valery Pryamikov
• Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Jean-Luc Cooke
  • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Simon Johnson
    • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Jean-Luc Cooke
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Phil Carmody
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Christophe Devine
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Juuso Hukkanen
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Matthew Fanto
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Luc The Perverse
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, ink
  • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, clark
    • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Simon Johnson
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, David Wagner
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, JR
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, David Eather
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, clark
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, David Eather
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, clark
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, fortune . bruce
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Douglas A. Gwyn
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: Seen Tom St Denis latly?, David A Molnar
• secure election with sms, citycrypt@xxxxxxxxx
  • Re: secure election with sms, Robert
    • Re: secure election with sms, citycrypt@xxxxxxxxx
  • Re: secure election with sms, Civitas Fenniae
    • Re: secure election with sms, citycrypt@xxxxxxxxx
  • Re: secure election with sms, Kimmo Koivisto
• AES Key expansion question, Robert
  • Re: AES Key expansion question, Simon Johnson
    • Re: AES Key expansion question, Robert
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Peter van Liesdonk
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Robert
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Peter van Liesdonk
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Simon Johnson
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Stefan Lucks
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Peter van Liesdonk
      • Re: AES Key expansion question, Stefan Lucks
  • Re: AES Key expansion question, Valery Pryamikov
  • Re: AES Key expansion question, jetmarc
• Key management vs. Authentication Tag Size, Ulfrei
  • Re: Key management vs. Authentication Tag Size, Mike Amling
    • Re: Key management vs. Authentication Tag Size, Ulfrei
• How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Mark Probert
  • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Simon Johnson
    • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Unruh
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, fortune . bruce
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, fortune . bruce
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, TomFoolery
  • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Unruh
  • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, rossum
  • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, yampolskiy
    • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Unruh
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Mark Probert
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, yampolskiy
      • Re: How random is RNGCryptoServiceProvider?, Mark Probert
• Re: more secure communication over the network, secretcodebreaker
• implemented DES brute force attack, Nikola Skoric
  • Re: implemented DES brute force attack, tor
  • Re: implemented DES brute force attack, Simon Johnson
    • Re: implemented DES brute force attack, Unruh
  • Re: implemented DES brute force attack, Peter Trei
• Unbalanced Feistel Networks security, Diego Taylor
• Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Peter van Liesdonk
  • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Peter van Liesdonk
      • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, sillybanter
      • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Peter van Liesdonk
      • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Kristian Gjøsteen
  • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, eike . kiltz
    • Re: Fujisaki-Okamoto Hybrid Encryption, Peter van Liesdonk
• Edible One-Time Pad books, admin
  • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Kristian Gjøsteen
  • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, David Eather
  • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, framarks
    • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Unruh
  • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Paul Rubin
    • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, admin
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, amitabh123
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Unruh
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Mike Amling
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, admin
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Unruh
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, admin
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Unruh
      • Re: Edible One-Time Pad books, Matt Mahoney
• Does Privacy Preserving Data Mining make any sence?, Sergei
  • Re: Does Privacy Preserving Data Mining make any sence?, Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: Does Privacy Preserving Data Mining make any sence?, Sergei
      • Re: Does Privacy Preserving Data Mining make any sence?, Kristian Gjøsteen
• Digital signature repository, David R. Tribble
  • Re: Digital signature repository, David R. Tribble
    • Re: Digital signature repository, Mike Amling
      • Re: Digital signature repository, David R. Tribble
      • Re: Digital signature repository, Mike Amling
• performance of One key MAC (OMAC), Ulf Reiman
• where use RSA?, athur-luobo
  • Re: where use RSA?, Pubkeybreaker
    • Re: where use RSA?, Carlos Moreno
• Help !!! RSA with OpenSSL, Carlos Moreno
  • Small errata: Help !!! RSA with OpenSSL, Carlos Moreno
  • Re: Help !!! RSA with OpenSSL, Christian Siebert
    • Re: Help !!! RSA with OpenSSL, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: Help !!! RSA with OpenSSL, Carlos Moreno
• BBS with unknown N parameter, Simon Johnson
  • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, David Eather
  • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Simon Johnson
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Christian Siebert
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Scott Contini
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Simon Johnson
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Scott Contini
  • Message not available
    • Message not available
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Simon Johnson
      • Re: BBS with unknown N parameter, Kristian Gjøsteen
• Cache Attack on AES, sukeshjain
• CryptoDox - Encyclopedia on Cryptography & Information Security, Anuj
  • Re: CryptoDox - Encyclopedia on Cryptography & Information Security, Paul Rubin
    • Re: CryptoDox - Encyclopedia on Cryptography & Information Security, lars . adler
    • Re: CryptoDox - Encyclopedia on Cryptography & Information Security, sillybanter
      • Re: CryptoDox - Encyclopedia on Cryptography & Information Security, Matt
• AES code in Sparc assember, bytebro
  • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Arthur J. O'Dwyer
    • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Rob Warnock
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Chris Card
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Message not available
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, clark
      • Message not available
      • Re: AES code in Sparc assember, Casper H . S . Dik
• how secure is SSL?, netscape
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mpilot
    • Re: how secure is SSL?, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mpilot
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Matthew Fanto
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Kristian Gjøsteen
    • Re: how secure is SSL?, Matthew Fanto
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Matthew Fanto
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mpilot
    • Re: how secure is SSL?, Matthew Fanto
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, netscape
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mpilot
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Matthew Fanto
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mpilot
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Mike Amling
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Thomas B.
  • Re: how secure is SSL?, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: how secure is SSL?, tick
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, tick
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: how secure is SSL?, Simon Johnson
• can anyone post a FAQ or explain in plain english what encryption really is?, tick
  • Re: can anyone post a FAQ or explain in plain english what encryption really is?, kalimaa
• Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, Nomen Nescio
  • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, netscape
  • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, nemo_outis
    • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, tick
      • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, nemo_outis
      • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, tick
      • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, nemo_outis
      • Re: Disk encryption software for Win98 and Win2000/XP, atapen@xxxxxxxxxxxx
• Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Naivite
  • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Unruh
  • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Peter Pearson
  • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, laura fairhead
  • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Simon Johnson
    • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Kristian Gjøsteen
      • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Simon Johnson
      • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, Kristian Gjøsteen
  • Re: Number generation based on a pattern of previously generated numbers, da5id65536@xxxxxxxxx
• Group verifiable encryption, Berlid
  • Re: Group verifiable encryption, Joseph Ashwood
• IBE and HIBE, brian . james . kirby
  • Re: IBE and HIBE, eike . kiltz
• group signature, guss
  • Re: group signature, vedaal
    • Re: group signature, enzymatic . bubble
      • Re: group signature, vedaal
      • Re: group signature, guss
      • Re: group signature, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: group signature, Vicious . vivacious
      • Re: group signature, vedaal
      • Re: group signature, Vicious . vivacious
      • Re: group signature, vedaal
      • Re: group signature, guss
      • Re: group signature, vedaal
• Storing data, hula
  • Re: Storing data, Ivan Voras
    • Re: Storing data, hula
      • Re: Storing data, Ivan Voras
  • Message not available
    • Re: Storing data, hula
      • Message not available
      • Re: Storing data, hula
      • Message not available
      • Re: Storing data, hula
      • Re: Storing data, Peter van Liesdonk
• what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Dmitry Chumack
  • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Christian Siebert
  • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Mike Amling
    • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Mike Amling
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Luc The Perverse
  • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, James Stroud
  • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
    • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Volker Hetzer
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Volker Hetzer
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Volker Hetzer
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Sergei
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Mike Amling
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Carlos Moreno
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Mike Amling
      • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
    • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Peter Fairbrother
    • Re: what is probability to create two equal hashes for md5 algorithm, Unruh
• Re: Language as a cipher?, Glenn P.,
• Need a quick advice plz, ttt.tas@xxxxxxxxx
  • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Ian Toltz
    • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Tom St Denis
    • Re: Need a quick advice plz, da5id65536
    • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Carlos Moreno
  • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Salami Man
    • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Tom St Denis
      • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Salami Man
      • Re: Need a quick advice plz, Ian Toltz
      • Re: Need a quick advice plz, zzz
• CSS: Disk key. Why?, Ernest Hammingweight
  • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Tom St Denis
    • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Tom St Denis
  • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Peter Fairbrother
    • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, clark
    • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Mike Amling
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Tom St Denis
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Ernest Hammingweight
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Tom St Denis
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Mike Amling
      • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, clark
  • Re: CSS: Disk key. Why?, Kristian Gjøsteen
• a simple question regarding AES, ttt . tas
  • Re: a simple question regarding AES, Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: a simple question regarding AES, Peter van Liesdonk
  • Re: a simple question regarding AES, Volker Hetzer
    • Re: a simple question regarding AES, ttt.tas@xxxxxxxxx
      • Re: a simple question regarding AES, Volker Hetzer
      • Re: a simple question regarding AES, ttt.tas@xxxxxxxxx
      • Re: a simple question regarding AES, Tom St Denis
      • Database encryption facilities (was: Re: a simple question regarding AES), Carlos Moreno
      • Re: Database encryption facilities, Volker Hetzer
• Re: Tämän hetkinen sää on Jumalan lahja ihmisille ....., kalimaa
• Re: Halarious, Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Halarious, zzz
• RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
  • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Tom St Denis
    • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Tom St Denis
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Tom St Denis
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Tom St Denis
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, Mike Amling
      • Re: RSACryptoServiceProvider or similar, hula
• Cryptography in the UK..., Oliver_FF
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., BRG
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Unruh
    • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Unruh
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., zzz
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Arthur J. O'Dwyer
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., mm
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., da5id65536
    • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Unruh
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Thad Mulligan
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., David Eather
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Unruh
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., da5id65536
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Daniel James
  • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Simon Johnson
    • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Richard Clayton
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Simon Johnson
    • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Unruh
      • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., Peter Fairbrother
    • Re: Cryptography in the UK..., BRG
• about joe-jobs/trolling, Tom St Denis
  • Re: about joe-jobs/trolling, clark
    • Re: about joe-jobs/trolling, Paul Rubin
      • Re: about joe-jobs/trolling, clark
  • Re: about joe-jobs/trolling, mm
• Shamir's Trick (EC-DSA verify), Tom St Denis
  • Re: Shamir's Trick (EC-DSA verify), Tom St Denis
• Electronic Signature Validator, mrella
• Dimensions of Encipherment, Mike McNally
  • Re: Dimensions of Encipherment, Jean-Luc Cooke
    • Re: Dimensions of Encipherment, Mike McNally
• Hardware Security Modules (HSM), karl
  • Re: Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Joseph Ashwood
  • Re: Hardware Security Modules (HSM), JR
  • Message not available
    • Re: Hardware Security Modules (HSM), zzz
      • Message not available
      • Re: Hardware Security Modules (HSM), Joseph Ashwood
• Inexpensive authentication, aliptah
  • Re: Inexpensive authentication, Matthew Fanto
    • Re: Inexpensive authentication, aliptah
      • Re: Inexpensive authentication, David Wagner
      • Re: Inexpensive authentication, aliptah
      • Re: Inexpensive authentication, David Eather
      • Re: Inexpensive authentication, David Wagner
      • Re: Inexpensive authentication, David Eather
  • Re: Inexpensive authentication, Kristian Gjøsteen
• RIPE-MD 160 ?, Senderos
• Cost of modexp's?, Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Pubkeybreaker
    • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Peter Fairbrother
  • Re: Cost of modexp's?, BRG
    • Re: Cost of modexp's?, robertwessel2@xxxxxxxxx
    • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Phil Carmody
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, BRG
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Peter Fairbrother
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, BRG
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Mike Scott
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, BRG
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Paul Rubin
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Tom St Denis
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Mike Amling
      • Re: Cost of modexp's?, BRG
  • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Marcus Streets
    • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Thomas Carter
    • Re: Cost of modexp's?, Tom St Denis
• Re: New attacks on the financial PIN processing, Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Re: Comaprison between MD5 and SHA, Stelian Ene
• XML encryption, xml
  • Re: XML encryption, Jean-Luc Cooke
    • Re: XML encryption, xml
      • Re: XML encryption, Jean-Luc Cooke
      • Re: XML encryption, xml
• 3rd Chaos Communication Congress: planned events/, Jan Panteltje
• Hash libraries, Thaddeus L Olczyk
  • Re: Hash libraries, Tom St Denis
    • Re: Hash libraries, Doug
  • Re: Hash libraries, Phil Carmody
• volunteer auditing/verification, Tom St Denis
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • volunteer auditing/verification, Tom St Denis
    • Re: volunteer auditing/verification, clark
      • Re: volunteer auditing/verification, Tom St Denis
      • Re: volunteer auditing/verification, clark
      • Re: volunteer auditing/verification, Tom St Denis
      • Re: volunteer auditing/verification, clark
• Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Chris De Young
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Unruh
    • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, VPE
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, VPE
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Unruh
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Peter van Liesdonk
    • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Markus Jansson
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, David Eather
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Luc The Perverse
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, ttw
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Markus Jansson
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, vedaal
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Markus Jansson
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, David Eather
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Alan
    • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Unruh
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Alan
      • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Alan
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, secretcodebreaker
    • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Pubkeybreaker
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, da5id65536
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Mike McNally
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, John Hadstate
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Simon Johnson
  • Re: Usable pen-and-paper ciphers?, Simon Johnson
• Re: Poly1305 vs. UMAC vs. new MAC1071, D. J. Bernstein
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Poly1305 vs. UMAC vs. new MAC1071, Wei Dai
    • Re: Poly1305 vs. UMAC vs. new MAC1071, D. J. Bernstein
      • Re: Poly1305 vs. UMAC vs. new MAC1071, Wei Dai
• AES CBC/CFB128 MCT tests, surryeverett
  • Re: AES CBC/CFB128 MCT tests, BRG
• Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, kalimaa
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, Peter Pearson
  • Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, Jean-Luc Cooke
  • Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, clark
  • Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, fortune . bruce
    • Re: ADVERT: C12-GAMMA, noload
• Re: Interesting paper: On the Power of Simple Branch Prediction Analysis, mm
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: Interesting paper: On the Power of Simple Branch Prediction Analysis, clark
• Re: Programs for breaking Classic Ciphers, Mike McNally
  • Re: Programs for breaking Classic Ciphers, secretcodebreaker
  • Re: Programs for breaking Classic Ciphers, secretcodebreaker
• Re: can you decrypt?, jon . mann
  • Re: can you decrypt?, Mike McNally
    • Re: can you decrypt?, Douglas A. Gwyn
      • Re: can you decrypt?, David Eather
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: can you decrypt?, Douglas A. Gwyn
    • Re: can you decrypt?, Luc The Perverse
      • Re: can you decrypt?, Mike McNally

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