PGP deployment for small company, some questions
- From: "HG" <hg.list@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 18 Oct 2006 03:46:17 -0700
I thought I knew PGP, but now that I'm deploying PGP 9.x for small
company I'm having lots of questions. I hope you can help me. The
situation in short is this:
- company with about 25-30 employees
- PGP desktop pro 9.5 to be installed for each
- Email system: Exchange + Outlook
- usages: email encryption, data encryption, software signing, whole
The usage and key selection I thought should be:
Corporate signing key
- no email, no encryption, only for signing (the subkey deleted after
- used to sign all keys from company
- posted on company web-page but not on keyserver (PGP global
- used and controlled by CSO
- signed by CSO personal key
- signed by corp. signing key
- has no email
- is split to parts (not held just by CSO)
- not posted to keyserver or web-server
- signed by corp.signing key
- can revoke all other keys except corp signing key (why? I do not
- held in practice by CSO
Personal email keys
- created by the users
- contains ADK
- contains the revoking key
- CSO verifies the keys and signs them with the corp. signing key
- are added to the PGP Global Directory
Other keys like software release key
- signed by corp. signing key
- posted on web-page
The idea is that our partners could easily find the PGP keys of our
personnel and be able to verify them by a key publicly located on our
web-server. And that if users lose their keys, we could revoke them and
create new ones. ADK would be great when some customers send data by
email or other media and encrypt it.
The problems I ran into and generated questions:
- PGP Global directory strips out all other signatures except those
done with keys itself contains. So, in my view, it breaks the
web-of-trust by not allowing other keys than what itself contains. Or
limits it severely.
So, should I really add emails to the company (signing at least) keys
so that I could update them to the global directory? Or should I forget
about the company verification (I do not want to)?
- GnuPG or other OpenPGP systems do not recognize ADK. This makes the
ADK quite unreliable. Also, as we do not have centrally managed PGP,
users can remove ADK from their keys without CSO knowing and without
breaking the corp.signature (I haven't tried this though).
Does all this mean I should forget the ADK? We do have possible uses
for encrypting data on our servers though. Does this really help there
- I do not know what kind of key should the revocation key be? Signing
only? Does it need email? Does it need to be in the global directory?
If a key is revoked, does it stay in the Global Directory preventing
the addition of a new key (as global directory accepts only one key per
- what about other keyservers? The PGP global directory doesn't seem to
synchronize to the others...
What do you think about the deployment plan in general? How have you
done it? I will write a policy about all this and it will be published
on the web-site together with the Corp.signing key.
Then what do you think about the PGP 9.5 policies? My view is that they
are going to make my users life very complicated (and therefore mine
also...) Should I just drop the opportunistic rule out and instruct
them to write [PGP] to the beginning of subject if they want encryption
and signing? What do you do? Of course, I will add strict rules to some
project members working with some clients. But I'm afraid that they
will end up with emails sitting in their outboxes and lots of
Sorry, many questions in one long post. Hope somebody has time to read
through this and answer some points. Thanks in advance.
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