Re: PK Key exchange scheme involving 3 parties



The program doesnt need to be public, but there's no way to protect it
during transmission to S in a secure way.

What do you mean by "protect"? Can't Alice sign the program? Can't
Alice and S establish a secure channel (using, e.g., TLS), and then have
Alice send the program over this secure channel from Alice to S?

I'm still having problems understanding the problem statement. Maybe
it would help if you described your threat model, your security goals,
the trust relationships between the parties, and any other constraints
(e.g., who knows which other parties' public keys, restrictions on
connectivity, and so on) concisely in a single place.
.



Relevant Pages

  • Re: bootstrapping a secure channel
    ... > that Alice and Bob recognize each others voices. ... Our goal was to come up with a way to create a secure channel (private ... computational resources were available to an attacker. ... the amount of data Alice and Bob have to compare. ...
    (sci.crypt)
  • Re: bootstrapping a secure channel
    ... >> that Alice and Bob recognize each others voices. ... The security of this rests on an assumption ... >> There is another standard approach to this kind of problem, ... Sharing this secret would require a secure channel, ...
    (sci.crypt)