Re: Simple secret-sharing protocol with verifiability
- From: Neo <neoscandal@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2006 14:40:23 +0000 (UTC)
Kristian Gjøsteen <kristiag+news@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in
news:8olqf3-og02.ln1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:
Neo <neoscandal@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The secret sharing scheme is key K is divided as k1,k2,....kn b/w n
users such that k1 xor k2 xor...kn = K. All the n keys are thus
required to form the key.
According to my verification protocol, the following hashes are built
initally when k1, k2.. etc are created:
h(k1), h(h(k1),k2), h(h(h(k1),k2),k3).... and so on upto kn. We now
have n digests.
This isn't secure if K is one bit long.
Use a commitment scheme. Every player gets his share. Everyone gets
a commitment to every share. Every player gets an opening of his
share.
Binding prevents any player from cheating. Hiding prevents leakage
of the secret.
Could you provide links where this is expalined more clearly. The key I
intend to use would minimum be 128 bits long.
Regards
.
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