Re: Fooling the phone tap
- From: "nemo_outis" <abc@xxxxxxx>
- Date: 01 Dec 2005 01:27:09 GMT
run_signature_script_for_my_email@xxxxxxxxxxx (laura fairhead) wrote in
> Where is your primary communication channel then ? I would argue the
> best cover is to make your primary communication channel look like
> something other than it is. For example, there are so many ways to try
> to avoid interception attacks by encoding your data but what about
> going one step further and add another layer by putting a wrapper over
> your coded data that makes it appear entirely like something inocuous.
> Recently I saw a film where the bad-guy had embedded his covert
> message behind a perfectly normal sounding phone call - so, if you
> happened to intercept that you might just be thrown off the scent. It
> is rather like the idea of when you have finalised your "secure
> installation" you put it at a site where there is a 2 mile ring of
> fields around it which looks like (and, to all intents and purposes)
> just a public leisure park. Of course it is within that zone that you
> put the micro-intrusion detection detectors that as soon as a mouse
> squeeks will pick it up and report the activity. The more it looks
> like something else, the more the attacker is likely to be deceived.
You raise some valid points, and your strategy has considerable merit.
But consider: There may be totally different strategies applicable to
avoiding coming to the notice of the authorities in the first place and
thwarting them once you have. The latter is, in fact, a desperate game.
I agree wholeheartedly that the prime strategy should be to avoid coming
to the notice of the authorities in the first place. And here stealth
and subterfuge, as you say, are king. But we require more - we require
defence in depth. We require protection even if our primary defences
In the end game, however skilled you are, and however inept they are, the
deck is stacked against you. Switching analogies, fighting authorities
once you have come to their notice is like entering an end game in chess
down a rook and a knight (or perhaps even a queen). The authorities may
screw up 99 times out of one hundred and still win on that last; you, on
the contrary, must be perfect. Slim odds indeed!
So, yes, the bulk of one's effort must be towards flying under the radar,
to not coming to their attention in the first place. And I agree the
strategy you describe has great merit for this aspect.
The reverse honeypot I described is a desperate measure that would only
come into play in the end game. It makes available a number of options
including cutting and running, obscuring - or discrediting - the evidence
if you are caught, and buying time.
But the version I envisage has a few other things going for it. If, for
instance, you normally diddle the info on your ordinary land line, you
are merely wasting a little time and effort if you are not already under
investigation - no harm done. If you are not already under investigation
the strategem has little downside other than the commitment of time and
other resources to implement it (which should be fairly small).
If, on the other hand, you do, at some time, come under observation, you
have significantly increased the "smoke and mirrors" factor. We often
underestimate ow difficult it is to infer the opponent's strategy from
the outside and how much more difficult even a little obfuscation and
obnubilation makes it; that is the conundrum I wish to present the
authorities if my outer defences are breached.
With a little luck I will be on that plane to Paraguay before they
unravel it :-)
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