"Once We Squeeze All We Can Out of the United States, It Can Dry Up and Blow Away."
From: Hurt (hurt_beyond_repair_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 09/20/05
- Next message: Mxsmanic: "Re: RSA encryption/decryption"
- Previous message: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: Email Encryption"
- Next in thread: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: "Once We Squeeze All We Can Out of the United States, It Can Dry Up and Blow Away.""
- Reply: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: "Once We Squeeze All We Can Out of the United States, It Can Dry Up and Blow Away.""
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Date: 20 Sep 2005 08:53:58 -0700
Well, he's got a point; the retards in our society do seem to have a
serious penis envy problem going on.
http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/exclusive1.htm
EXCLUSIVE REPORT: THE DEMISE OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
The Neo-Cons' Unfettered Access to America's Secrets
By Wayne Madsen
©2005, WayneMadsenReport.com. All Rights Reserved.
During the Cold War, if the United States suffered a massive compromise
of its own cryptographic security and, at the same, time experienced a
thorough penetration of its communications intelligence yielding the
sensitive sources and methods whereby the U.S. intelligence community
tapped and decrypted the communications of its adversaries, the Soviet
Union would have been able to dictate surrender terms for America and
its allies.
For years, the National Security Agency (NSA) maintained highly
classified back doors into the encrypted communications of worldwide
foreign ministries, military commands, banks, international
organizations, and even the Vatican, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, and the United Nations. In addition, the United States spent
billions of dollars to develop highly secure cryptographic systems to
protect its military, intelligence, and diplomatic communications from
the prying ears and eyes of its enemies.
However, according to U.S. intelligence sources with connections to
both the Reagan and Clinton administrations, America's most sensitive
communications security and cryptologic secrets have been totally
compromised by a Fifth Column embedded within the recent past and
current administrations - the group generally identified as
"neo-conservatives," political ideologues rooted in a peculiar
blend of Trotskyism and fascism -- ideologues who are neither "new"
nor "conservative" in ideology but whose intentions are to weaken
America's national security to a degree that ruins the very
foundations on which the nation was built.
One of the major NSA success stories since its establishment on October
24, 1952 was the rigging of the encryption machines of the Swiss
company Crypto AG in a secret deal cut between NSA's William Friedman
and Boris Hagelin, the developer of the Hagelin cipher machine used by
the Allies in World War II. In 1958, Hagelin, who founded Crypto AG in
1950, agreed to the deal with NSA. It was the height of the Cold War.
For U.S. intelligence, the Hagelin-NSA deal was an intelligence coup on
the level of the U.S. breaking of Germany's Enigma code and Japan's
Purple code in World War II. Neutral nations trusted a Swiss company to
sell encryption machines as highly-reliable as Swiss watches and as
trusted as Swiss bank accounts. Non-aligned nations like Egypt,
Indonesia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Yemen, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia, and Argentina became contented Crypto AG users. Upon
independence, Britain's Commonwealth Office offered the British
Empire's newly-independent states a sweetheart deal. They could
protect their sensitive diplomatic communications with free surplus
Hagelin cryptographic machines like the C-52 cipher machine once used
by Britain. Nations like India, Pakistan, Ghana, Burma, Ceylon,
Nigeria, Kenya, Kuwait, and Jordan enthusiastically accepted the offer
along with mechanical modifications to handle non-Latin alphabets like
Arabic, Burmese, Thai, and Farsi. The users were unaware that all their
coded traffic was an open book to NSA and Britain's Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), NSA's British signals
intelligence partner in a secret intelligence-sharing pact known as the
UK-USA Agreement. French-speaking Crypto AG salesmen had tremendous
success in francophone former French and Belgian African colonies to
use their ciphering machines after independence. Soon, governments in
the Central African Republic, Morocco, Tunisia, Gabon, Upper Volta,
Dahomey, Cameroon, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa),
Senegal, Malagasy Republic, and Chad were encrypting their
communications not aware that everything was being decoded and read by
NSA.
Eventually, Crypto AG's encryption machines went digital. The
encryption mechanisms, according to a U.S. intelligence source, were
contained in an electronically programmable read-only memory (EPROM)
unit known as HC6800 (the "HC" standing for "Hagelin Cipher").
As Crypto AG sold more and more of its units to some 120 countries
around the world, the NSA's ability to read encrypted traffic was a
virtual gold mine of intelligence. Convinced the Swiss firm was an
honest broker, the Iranian Islamic regime, Libya's Muammar el
Qaddafi, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the Philippine's Ferdinand Marcos,
Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam, Equatorial Guinea's brutal
dictator Francisco Macias Nguema, and Uganda's Idi Amin all scrambled
their secret money movements, assassination orders, and clandestine
arms deals with Crypto's machines. And everything was known to
Washington.
That was, until 1983, when the Soviets became aware of the Crypto AG
secret project courtesy of the classified information passed to Israel
by convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard. The Naval Intelligence Field
Operational Intelligence Office employee, in the course of passing a
garage-full of classified documents and computer disks to Israeli
intelligence, compromised one of NSA's most important sources and
methods of intelligence gathering. Included among the classified NSA
documents passed to Israel was RASIN (Radio-Signal Notations), the
multi-volume TOP SECRET UMBRA encyclopedia of how the NSA collected
signals around the world. However, the Crypto AG disclosures were
contained in an even higher classified set of documents compromised by
Pollard.
Pollard's Scientific Liaison Unit (LAKAM) handler Rafael ("Rafi")
Eitan spirited Pollard's intelligence take off to Israel where some
of it was traded to the Soviet Union in return for an increase in the
number of Soviet Jews permitted to emigrate to Israel. America's
ability to read the encrypted traffic of all of Israel's neighbors
(Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) was immediately
compromised to the detriment of United States interests in the Middle
East. Pollard's intelligence also included details of the Pakistani
atomic bomb project and the A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network.
According to a 1999 New Yorker article by Seymour Hersh, Pollard had
also been involved in trying to broker arms sales to the Afghan rebels
in 1985 - an activity that would have put the Israeli spy in direct
contact with the Mujaheddin, which was then bankrolled by the Saudis
and included Osama Bin Laden and his nascent future "Al Qaeda"
terrorists.
Thanks to Pollard's disclosures to the Soviets, NSA's prized
collection project was immediately compromised to the KGB and GRU
military intelligence. The KGB and GRU found out about the "seed
key" used by NSA as a master key" to unlock encoded communications
transmitted by Crypto AG machines.
For a while NSA's secret was only known to the Soviets and Israelis.
However, in March 1992, after Hans Buehler, Crypto AG's marketing
representative in Iran was arrested by Iranian counter-intelligence for
spying for the "intelligence services of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States of America," NSA's operations were
truly out of the bag and thrust into the public limelight. Buehler was
jailed in Tehran's infamous Evin prison for nine months. Eventually,
Crypto AG paid a $1 million bail for Buehler's release. After
returning to Switzerland, Buehler documented his experience and the NSA
rigging program in a book titled Verschluesselt.
Although it is undetermined who tipped off the Iranians about the NSA
Trojan horse embedded in their Crypto AG machines, U.S. intelligence
sources have revealed that Israel gained the most from the disclosure
of the Crypto operation, originally compromised by their American spy
Pollard. Ex-CIA agents report that the Russian intelligence successors
to the former KGB were actually tipped off about the Crypto AG project
CIA spy Aldrich Ames. While still acting as a spy for the Russians
after the Soviet collapse, Ames reportedly told the Russians about the
Crypto machines. The Russians, in turn, tipped off the Iranians that
their Crypto AG units were rigged by the NSA. The Russians may have
received additional information on the Crypto units from longtime
Soviet and Russian FBI spy Robert Hanssen. CIA sources claim Hanssen
could not have gotten his job without high-level support from more
senior FBI officials, including his Opus Dei co-religionist and
personal friend Louis Freeh, Jr., the FBI Director.
Although Crypto AG (and its secret partner Siemens of Germany) paid
Buehler's bail and tried to bury the story, the effect of Crypto
AG's sales was immediate. Country after country and bank after bank
began to have reservations about the equipment despite Crypto's
assurances. Spain and Japan reportedly canceled sales. A number of
longtime customers switched to high grade Russian encryption gear.
According to U.S. intelligence sources, shortly after the revelations
by Buehler and other Crypto engineers about the NSA project,
Switzerland-based international billionaire fugitive and suspected
Mossad asset Marc Rich stepped in and invested heavily in Crypto AG's
to boost its deflated stock values. Rich was pardoned by President
Clinton in January 2001 in an eleventh hour deal partly negotiated by
Rich's attorney (and current Vice President *** Cheney's chief of
staff and CIA "Leakgate" suspect) I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby.
The deal with Rich was a Faustian one for Crypto AG. NSA was forced to
abandon its prized signals intelligence operation. Communications
currently encoded by Crypto AG machines are now, according to U.S.
intelligence sources, routinely read by Rich and his Israeli
intelligence contacts. Although the encryption technology graduated
from computerized central processing units to surface mounted
encryption boards, the security trap doors still exist, according to
intelligence sources.
Encrypted cables between oil companies and buyers, including spot
market dealers, allegedly allow Rich and his friends to underbid
lucrative oil contracts. In addition, compromised "secure" bank
networks have permitted fake wire transfers to loot numbered bank
accounts, including those held by Saudi and Vatican officials. These
revelations apparently resulted in the mysterious murder three years
ago of the Crypto AG salesman in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the ability by
the Israelis to monitor diplomatic, intelligence, and financial traffic
prior to the 911 terrorist attacks permitted international speculators
to place "put" options on the stocks of American and United
Airlines just prior to September 11, 2001 - an operation that yielded
hundreds of millions in profits.
The deal with Rich was a Faustian one for Crypto AG. NSA was forced to
abandon its prized signals intelligence operation.
In the early 1990s, a transfer of five KY-78 encryption devices by
Canada to a NATO base in Germany resulted in a disastrous compromise of
U.S. communications security (COMSEC) secrets to the Israelis.
According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Canadians transferred the
five of the machines to their CANLOG (Canadian Logistics) United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) post at Camp Ziounai
(nicknamed by the Canadians "Camp Roofless") on the Golan Heights
in the Separation Zone between Israeli and Syrian forces. During a
rotation of Canadian personnel, two of the encryption machines went
missing. After a COMSEC audit was conducted, the Canadian
communications supervisor reported he had "at least four" of the
KY-78s on the books but could only account for two. Since only one was
required for communications, he shipped one back to Germany. However,
three of the highly classified units remained missing. Two of the units
ended up in the hands of Israeli intelligence and were taken apart and
fully examined by Mossad crypto experts. Israeli human intelligence
agents procured the machine's key codes from other sources.
The results were disastrous for U.S. and NATO secure communications.
During Operation Desert Storm, the Israelis were able to read all of
the encrypted traffic in and out of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. U.S.
intelligence sources report the only secured communications to and from
the embassy was by diplomatic pouch. To cover the fact that they had
obtained the codes from the Canadian Golan post, Israeli intelligence
began setting up U.S. Marine guards at the Tel Aviv embassy with local
prostitutes as a feint to divert attention away from the KY-78
compromise on the Golan to the unwitting Marines as possible crypto
thieves in the eyes of U.S. counter-intelligence agents.
Ironically, after the compromise the Canadian peacekeepers replaced
their KY-78s with similarly compromised Crypto AG equipment. As for the
U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, after its coded communications were
compromised and this became known to NSA, the embassy's encryption
devices were rewired and the codes were changed.
The Israelis were then forced to rely on human intelligence assets
within the embassy to feed them classified information. Enter Air Force
Reserve officer Larry Franklin - a Defense Intelligence Agency
analyst who was first detailed in 1993 to perform his reserve active
duty at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Franklin would serve repeated
tours of duty at the embassy. Earlier this year, Franklin and two
officials of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were
indicted for mishandling highly classified U.S. intelligence. Franklin
was discovered to have stashed 83 classified documents, including
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) files at his West Virginia
home. Franklin was accused of passing classified documents to the AIPAC
officials who had maintained a liaison with an Israeli intelligence
official at the Israeli embassy in Washington.
Soon, Franklin would have some intelligence assistance at the Tel Aviv
embassy. Enter U.S. ambassador Martin Indyk, a naturalized U.S. citizen
from Australia. Strangely, Indyk had two tours of duty as U.S.
ambassador to Israel - from 1995 to 1997 and from 2000 to 2001.
According to U.S. intelligence sources, Indyk was a valued supplier of
classified U.S. intelligence to Israel. In 2000, Indyk had his security
clearance yanked. Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright denied
that Indyk was suspected of espionage, U.S. intelligence sources tell
an entirely different story. State Department Bureau of Diplomatic
Security agents discovered that Indyk routinely took home classified
materials where they were left to be photocopied by his maid who
doubled as a Mossad operative. Indyk also reportedly allowed his
Israeli dinner guests to read other classified documents. Knowing this,
State Diplomatic Security agents planted some "classified"
documents on Indyk and waited for them to appear. After they turned up
through the suspected channels, Indyk's security clearance was
lifted.
CIA sources have confirmed that the neo-con penetration of NSA's raw
telecommunications intercept data by John Bolton was part of a
multi-pronged attempt by Israeli intelligence to access the "Fort
Knox" of America's cryptologic secrets: the massive repository
database of global intercepts of phone calls, email, faxes, and telexes
now known as "ANCHORY" but will soon be expanded into a super
database code named "OCEANARIUM." As a result of former NSA
Director Michael Hayden's outsourcing contracts named
"Groundbreaker" and "Trailblazer," companies with ties to
Israeli intelligence are gaining increased access to NSA's operations
and its massive archives of secrets.
The FBI also had severe problems with communications compromises during
the lead up to 911. FBI agents tailing Israeli agents in the United
States (who, in turn, were living and working in close proximity to the
Al Qaeda hijackers) were stymied by the compromise of secure FBI and
Justice Department communications systems by Israeli contractor
telecommunications companies such as AMDOCS and Comverse Infosys. In
addition, Israeli software companies had permitted Mossad unfettered
access to credit card and telephone records of U.S.
counter-intelligence agents. America's counter-intelligence community
was trying to do its job with one hand tied behind its back.
The Mossad operatives the FBI's New York Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) was tailing in the New York and New Jersey areas covered their
communications by using untraceable Verizon pre-paid cellular phones
and Nextel two-way walkie-talkie devices. Mossad agents were also
trailing and harassing CIA agents assigned to track people like lead
hijacker Mohammed Atta, especially in Fort Lee, New Jersey where Atta
lived for a while. An attempt by the FBI to penetrate New York and New
Jersey Israeli intelligence-connected office moving companies, such as
Urban Moving Systems, which was discovered to have conducted an
emergency move of the Israeli Zim-American Israeli Shipping Company
from the World Trade Center's North Tower just weeks prior to 911,
were disrupted by communications compromises and pressure from FBI and
Justice Department headquarters in Washington, DC. Much of that
pressure reportedly originated from then-U.S. Attorney for Northern New
Jersey Michael Chertoff, the current Secretary of Homeland Security.
U.S. intelligence sources report that the late FBI agent John O'Neill
was well aware of the suspicious Israeli activity in the lead up to
911. One FBI was taken off the Israeli surveillance operations and sent
to Pakistan to investigate the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street
Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. According to U.S. intelligence sources,
Pearl was killed not by Al Qaeda but by paid foreign hit men hired to
get rid of someone who was getting "too close" to the actual money
sources that paid for the 911 attack.
U.S. intelligence sources report that the one Israeli who is considered
an extreme threat to U.S. national security is former Prime Minister
and current Prime Minister hopeful Binyamin Netanyahu. Not only has
Netanyahu visited convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard in his North
Carolina prison cell and advocated strenuously for his release but he
was once overheard by an ex-CIA agent as saying to a group of his
supporters, "Once we squeeze all we can out of the United States, it
can dry up and blow away." Considering the damage the neo-cons and
their Israeli facilitators are causing for U.S. national security,
Netanyahu may soon have his wish.
- Next message: Mxsmanic: "Re: RSA encryption/decryption"
- Previous message: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: Email Encryption"
- Next in thread: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: "Once We Squeeze All We Can Out of the United States, It Can Dry Up and Blow Away.""
- Reply: Ari Silversteinn: "Re: "Once We Squeeze All We Can Out of the United States, It Can Dry Up and Blow Away.""
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]