Re: Re-secured Algorithm?
From: Harlan Lieberman-Berg (sysadmin_at_tacticalbusinesspartners.com)
Date: 08/19/05
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Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2005 19:07:41 -0400
> DSA doesn't require SHA1. Ok, the standard might claim that you have
> to use SHA1, but the algorithm can (as far as I know) be used perfectly
> fine with any other hash algorithm (e.g., SHA-2), as long as you adjust
> the parameter sizes correspondingly.
It was my understanding that SHA-2 was identical to SHA-1, except for
coming in 256, 38something, and 512 bit lengths. Please, correct me if
I'm wrong.
> Third, the workfactor for the best collision attack on SHA1 currently
> known seems to require 2^63 work and a chosen-message attack. That's
> certainly not good, but you may not have to panic just yet.
No, we don't have to panic quite yet. But it is time to start looking for
alternatives and implementing them now, rather than when it is down to a
reasonable crack-time.
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