Re: Should be in crypto for John E. Hadstate Re: just stupid?

From: Terry Ritter (
Date: 07/29/05

Date: 29 Jul 2005 11:23:49 -0700

Joe Peschel wrote:
> No! Ritter was cited an as expert by this CryptoSMS fellow. His was an
> "Appeal to Authority" argument, and was in this case, a logical fallacy.

Is every statement which gives a name an appeal to
authority error? Clearly not, and the distinction
is obvious:

Authority tends to hide the basis for drawing
conclusions. Authority tends to avoid addressing
complaints of false reasoning. Authority tends to
hide reasoning and insists that a statement is
correct simply because of who made it. We have
all seen this many times, often because the person
repeating the conclusion has no idea of the
reasoning behind it, or what it really means.

In contrast, scientific thought exposes the factual
basis and the reasoning, which tells us what the
conclusion really means. Scientific thought is
democratic and informs, and ideally gives everyone
the same ability to draw factual conclusions, some
of which may be new, but still correct.

As I see it, my name was cited for my particular
conclusions on Multiple Encryption, all of which
were developed from facts and reasoning, all of
which is extensively documented on my pages,
starting with my Glossary. That is not Authority,
that is shorthand for an entire body of available
work. You would do well to learn the difference.

> In other words, if an authority is cited as an expert on the subject, he
> ought to actually be an expert on the subject. In this case, the issue is
> cryptology, and Mr. Ritter is an engineer and, unfortunately, not a
> cryptologist.

I doubt Shannon would have called himself "a

Vernam actually was an engineer when he came
up with mechanical stream ciphering which then
led to the academically-loved one-time-pad.

I do in fact claim expertise in particular areas
of cryptography, based on over a decade of work
and publication, including refereed articles and
issued fundamental patents in the field.

My innovations include Dynamic Substitution,
Dynamic Transposition, and Balanced Block Mixing.
I have presented insights into randomness
production, randomness testing, population
measurement and Boolean function nonlinearity.
I also continue to referee articles for various
journals when they address my areas of interest,
also including Latin squares, orthogonal Latin
squares, fast Walsh transforms, etc.

> When we encrypt with multiple different ciphers, the resulting encryption
> needs to analyzed as if it was one (not a cascade of ciphers) cipher.

I disagree: We do not insist on "analyzing" a
cipher with each exact key that may be used.
Yet a bad key can be a real issue: With some
conventional block ciphers, some keys could
possibly create the identity permutation, or
some other simple permutation, or a substantial
part thereof. Very few ciphers are proven to
produce no such result.

Sometimes known weak keys are identified and
eliminated, but then that becomes a bias to
the randomness of the keys. Other times, the
probability of weak keys is known to be very
small and is then ignored. More often, the
probability of key weakness is simply unknown.
And then we still do not "analyze" the cipher
under each new key.

A general system in which keying selected a stack
arbitrary ciphers on a message-by-message basis
could easily test adjacent cipher keys to assure
they differ, if that was thought worthwhile.

Terry Ritter   1.3MB Crypto Glossary