Re: crypto sms

From: \ (jonez_at_norcom.ca)
Date: 06/23/05 

Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 23:49:28 -0600

Stephen Sprunk wrote:
> <Crypto@S.M.S> wrote in message
> news:11bk5vg83mbkd9@news.supernews.com...
> > sammy wrote:
> > > I've heard the French authorities now actually strongly recommend
> > > CryptoSMS to French citizens who inquire as to which method they
> > > should use to keep their information private.
> >
> > Since the French authorities uninstalled CryptoSMS from the
> > temporarily confiscated computers, one can take that as a
> > back-handed endorsement of its strength, or at least its
> > strength as seen by the police.
>
> Or it could be a feint to make people draw that conclusion. Quite
> possibly the French authorities were able to crack the messages sent
> but decided the gain from admitting that _in this particular case_
> was not worth disclosing that they had the ability. By not
> disclosing, they give people a (potentially) false sense of security
> and more likely to use a flawed system, providing them with more and
> more self-identified criminals to track and snoop on.
>
> > One of the Sci.Crypt know-it-alls is currently attempting
> > to break it, but failing at the challenge. He claimed he
> > could do it in an hour, but it has been many days, although
> > he isn't admitting defeat. Kudos for his tenacity.
>
> Failure to crack a system is not proof of security. I could post
> something rot13 encrypted here and there's a pretty good chance nobody
> would ever bother trying to crack it.
>
> There are dozens of flawed systems proposed here every week; just sit
> back and you'll see them roll in like clockwork. Some are ignored,
> others are shown to be fatally flawed within hours. Yours is
> complicated enough that trying to crack an example probably isn't
> worth anyone here's time, but there's a long enough list of serious
> concerns about the structure that will lead most observers to
> conclude it's flawed without the need for a concrete example.
>
> Remember, security can't be proven -- it can only be disproven.

So put your $$ where your mouth is -- disprove it:

It's been over 182 hours ...so put up or shut up --

      Newsgroups: misc.legal, sci.crypt, talk.politics.crypto, us.legal
      From: poster <pos...@use.net>
      Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2005 15:02:49 +1000
      Local: Tues,Jun 14 2005 1:02 am
      Subject: Re: crypto for Joseph Ashwood?

      Since I'm a CryptoSMS user, I am very curious just how clever
      Mr Ashwood is. Attached below are three CryptoSMS messages, all
      of which are encrypted with the same passphrase and all of which
      contain the same clear text. Mr Ashwood, would you please crack
      these and post the contents for all to see? It should be easy
      since you have 3 individual messages which are all internally
      identical. Good luck.

      ??31m3dH-zpJ2ta8zI07sFm5o-UX5w­rMwKtUOGffGoqz98P7RrUE0bNu4Yu0­Sue-ZdUaNXK000??

      ??31SdibaVtKZ=50U74hLnQYg558NM­=dopXVivzD5LOu1XQFqYIC1IK-6O1G­7LQaRBbL41G000??

      ??31jKvmpN7DsULlMlD9ojQbe17m3R­8eA8FL51HM1vln=zB3GkwtRBjcp3wS­-2wRmcatMXK000??

<cue crickets chirping while the self-appointed cryptocritics FAIL to crack
such a defective and simplistic encryption>

Relevant Pages

  • Re: crypto sms
    ... >>Since the French authorities uninstalled CryptoSMS from the ... > use a flawed system, providing them with more and more self-identified ... > Failure to crack a system is not proof of security. ...
    (sci.crypt)
  • Re: crypto sms
    ... >> I've heard the French authorities now actually strongly recommend ... >> CryptoSMS to French citizens who inquire as to which method they ... use a flawed system, providing them with more and more self-identified ... Failure to crack a system is not proof of security. ...
    (sci.crypt)