Re: XOR passphrase with a constant

From: Andrew (anelless_at_gmail.com)
Date: 05/28/05 

Date: 28 May 2005 05:48:15 -0700

Are you saying that prepending a constant string to the passphrase also
doesn't change the entropy or give any further advantage to an
attacker? (with common hashes like MD5 and SHA)

I have read up on the HMAC approach. The known string (or key if I used
the HMAC approach) will be known to the attacker... but there is a good
reason for it's use.

Relevant Pages

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  • Re: MACs + Encryption + same Key
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