Re: Disk/Partition level encryption.
From: none (_at_(none))
Date: 03/31/05
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Date: Fri, 01 Apr 2005 09:48:42 +1200
Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote:
> Tom St Denis <tomstdenis@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't really care about data integrity checking - if an attacker cannot
> put any sensible (after decrypting) data, file system is going to detect
> it. The worst scenario is kernel panic, but that's ok.
>
A fool and his folly..... Really. This is simply a bad approach. There
should be authentication even without encryption. But never the other
way round. Kernel Panic maybe ok. arbitrary execution behavour is not
and be the result... among other things.
There really is no such thing as a secure msg if there is no
authentication of the msg contents. Or file for that matter.
Greg
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