Re: Thou shalt have no other gods before the ANSI C standard
From: Tom Linden (tom_at_kednos.com)
Date: 02/20/05
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Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2005 06:07:52 -0800
On Sat, 19 Feb 2005 21:17:31 -0800, Lars Poulsen <lars@beagle-ears.com>
wrote:
> Brian Inglis wrote:
>> This is a problem because most home PC users neither know or care if
>> someone else has taken over their PC for spamming or DDoS as long as
>> they can listen to their CDs or MP3s, view their DVDs or photos, and
>> print those and whatever they're interested in from the internet. That
>> causes problems for businesses, using similarly vulnerable
>> systems, who invest too little in maintaining current and effective
>> blocking, prevention, and detection mechanisms.
>
> Both at home and at the office, I run a typical "small business"
> setup with a Linux-based edge router, a Linux file and application
> server and a gagle of Windows desktops around them. And in both
> places, I find a server compromised every few months, despite
> a moderately aggressive amount of firewalling. I usually find
> them when I read the periodic reports from the programs that
> scan the system logs. Cleaning up is ugly, boring and timecon-
> suming and I tend to be defensive when my business partner asks
> why I have my head in the server all day again. He is somewhat
> sceptical when I explain what happens and how a 'bot sits
> and waits for a chatroom-server in Romania, Sweden or the Nether-
> lands to give it commands. Of course we can't have this kind of
> infection on the server that holds our critical business data.
Did you consider running VMS with WASD?
>
> My partner keeps asking if it is such a challenge for me, whom
> he is charitable enough to consider competent, how do most businesses
> handle this? My answer is that most of them are infected, but
> they don't pay enough attention to discover it.
>
> I'm beginning to work on a dynamic firewall ... an embedded
> system that has a list of legitimate services, and notes and
> totally blocks access from anyone who tries to connect to
> anything else, at least for a time interval that increases
> exponentially on repeated attempts. (The idea being that anyone
> who is knocking on a non-existent service is probably up to no
> good, and should not be allowed into the legitimate services
> either.) Yes, I know there are commercial products out there,
> but they contain too much code for me to feel entirely safe.
> By rolling my own, I can keep it to a few thousand lines,
> which makes me feel much safer.
>
> / Lars Poulsen
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