Re: SHA1 broken
From: Paul Rubin (//phr.cx_at_NOSPAM.invalid)
Date: 02/16/05
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Date: 16 Feb 2005 09:00:02 -0800
daw@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner) writes:
> >Does that wide-trail stuff provide any results about distinguishing
> >attacks as opposed to actual message recovery?
>
> No. It only provides results about security against differential and
> linear cryptanalysis. Basically, it just involves counting the number
> of active S-boxes in any simple differential characteristic (for instance).
Well, clearly I didn't expect it to say anything about unknown
attacks, but when a wide-trail calculation says "6 rounds makes this
cipher secure against differential cryptanalysis", I'm wondering if
that means it takes more work than brute force to recover actual
plaintext by differential cryptanalysis, or whether it can mean it
takes more work than brute force to merely distinguish the permutation
from a random one.
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