Re: Hardness of DDH with short exponents
From: Heiko Stamer (stamer_at_gaos.org)
Date: 02/02/05
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Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2005 00:26:14 +0100
First, I want to thank everybody who contributed to this thread.
Julia Faflek wrote:
> I refer you to the paper "Koshiba & Kurosawa: Short Exponent
> Diffie-Hellman Problems" (PKC 2004, LNCS 2947, pp. 173-186) in which it
> is shown that short-exponent-DDH is as hard as DDH and discrete
> logarithms with short exponents.
I've got it and roughly read. This was exactly the reference I was
looking for. Thus one can compute the masking operations [1] in a more
efficient way. The additional DLSE assumption seems to be reasonable for
our application. However, we should "add a large safety margin" ;-)
By the way: Camenisch et al. [2] using a subgroup DDH assumption to
guarantee privacy in their "Direct Anonymous Attestation" protocol.
They use non-shifted but shortened exponents (split into two parts,
each of size e.g. 104 bit) and work in a prime order (e.g. |q| 208 bit)
subgroup of Z/pZ (|p| 1632 bit), where p = rq + 1 and p, q are both
primes. Can their assumption be related to DLSE+DDH, too?
David Wagner wrote:
>>I don't understand the problem. Where is the difference when using a
>>group G of odd order? Then it is possible to shift the least significant
>>bits which are zero by (g^r)^(2^-i mod |G|) to the high-order bits or
>>not?
>
> I agree. Sounds equivalent if the group order |G| is known and odd.
For our group QR_p the order is known (odd prime). Although the generation
of safe primes is less efficient it does not really matter here, because
this part will be done very rarely.
[1] Adam Barnett, Nigel P. Smart: Mental Poker Revisited, 2003.
[2] E. Brickell, J. Camenisch, L. Chen: Direct Anonymous Attestation, 2004.
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