electronic voting system
From: Zeljko Vrba (ime.prezime_at_oss.unist.hr)
Date: 11/18/04
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Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2004 08:38:22 +0000 (UTC)
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What is wrong with the following electronic voting scenario:
1. The government issues as many blank smart-cards as there are registered
voters. Each card has a unique serial number that is made public.
2. There are two state-wide lists: one of registered voters, and one with
serial numbers of issued cards.
3. Each voter picks up his card at a government office. This is recorded in
the voters list (which must be always online) so that he can't pick up a
card at another office. He is allowed to choose an arbitrary unmarked card
from a pile of cards. That way the serial number of the card can't be
linked to the voter so that his vote remains unknown to anyone but himself.
4. At the office, the voter inserts the card into the provided terminal
equipment to generate a public/private key pair (this is to ensure that the
private key is not known to the card manufacturer beforehand). The
goverment publishes the 'certificate' for the registered voter's card
containing (public key, card serial number) pair as the only information.
5. When it comes to elections, the voter signs the (choice, card serial#)
with his on-card private key.
This scenario has the following properties:
- anonimity (public card data and voter's choice can't be linked to the
real person)
- votes can't be forged
- votes can be easily verified to be authentic
- it is possible to prevent a single voter to vote multiple times
- it is not possible to insert additional cards in the list to fake votes
because there is a state-wide list of serial numbers. votes with card
serial number not appearing on the government list of serials are
discarded (unless someone tampers with the list, which should be protected
against modification).
One problem with this scheme that comes to mind is with lost cards: a voter
can't request a replacement card without proving that he lost the previous
(otherwise, he could lie that he lost the card and thus obtain the right to
two votes). However, the proof would reveal all of his past votes.
What else needs to be fulfilled to have fair anonymous elections? This scheme
seems simple, so it could lead to system where the majority of CITIZENS decide
about laws, regulations and THEIR interests, not the majority of CONGRESS and
congressmen's interests.
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The corresponding PGP public key is located at
http://ds.carnet.hr:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x16DA1F1690887E13
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KIAOfamjOdc1UKnJyheNCN8=
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- Reply: Bill Unruh: "Re: electronic voting system"
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