Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?

From: David Wagner (daw_at_taverner.cs.berkeley.edu)
Date: 09/17/04

  • Next message: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?" 
    Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2004 03:59:55 +0000 (UTC)

    Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
    >David Wagner wrote:
    >> The task of verifying lack of buffer overruns is trivial if your language
    >> renders it impossible to even express a buffer overrun (e.g., Java is
    >> memory safe; there is no way to write code that has a buffer overrun,
    >> and hence is safe).
    >
    >That's a common misconception.

    If you think so, perhaps it would be appropriate to say why.

    Also, perhaps you could say which you believe to be a misconception.
    I spot three claims in the text you quoted from me. Which one of those
    three are you labelling a misconception, and why is that claim inaccurate?

  • Next message: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"