Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?
From: David Wagner (daw_at_taverner.cs.berkeley.edu)
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2004 03:59:55 +0000 (UTC)
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>David Wagner wrote:
>> The task of verifying lack of buffer overruns is trivial if your language
>> renders it impossible to even express a buffer overrun (e.g., Java is
>> memory safe; there is no way to write code that has a buffer overrun,
>> and hence is safe).
>That's a common misconception.
If you think so, perhaps it would be appropriate to say why.
Also, perhaps you could say which you believe to be a misconception.
I spot three claims in the text you quoted from me. Which one of those
three are you labelling a misconception, and why is that claim inaccurate?