Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?
From: Douglas A. Gwyn (DAGwyn_at_null.net)
Date: 09/16/04
- Next message: Paul Rubin: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Previous message: Douglas A. Gwyn: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- In reply to: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Next in thread: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Reply: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 21:01:00 GMT
David Wagner wrote:
> The task of verifying lack of buffer overruns is trivial if your language
> renders it impossible to even express a buffer overrun (e.g., Java is
> memory safe; there is no way to write code that has a buffer overrun,
> and hence is safe).
That's a common misconception.
- Next message: Paul Rubin: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Previous message: Douglas A. Gwyn: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- In reply to: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Next in thread: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Reply: David Wagner: "Re: "Perfect" or "Provable" security both crypto and non-crypto?"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Relevant Pages
|