Re: strengthening /dev/urandom
From: Mok-Kong Shen (mok-kong.shen_at_t-online.de)
Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 09:07:03 +0200
Guy Macon wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen <email@example.com> says...
>>if we all agree that e.g.
>>AES in CTR is secure enough, are there any 'objective'
>>reasons against employing such good pseudo-randomness in
>>lieu of hardware randomness from, say, /dev/random?
> "/dev/random should be suitable for uses that need very
> high quality randomness such as one-time pad or key
> -/dev/random man page
But this is from /dev/random itself and hence is a rather
'subjective' opinion. (Cf. a manufacturer's booklet on its
M. K. Shen