Re: strengthening /dev/urandom

From: Mok-Kong Shen (
Date: 09/02/04

Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 09:07:03 +0200

Guy Macon wrote:
> Mok-Kong Shen <> says...
>>if we all agree that e.g.
>>AES in CTR is secure enough, are there any 'objective'
>>reasons against employing such good pseudo-randomness in
>>lieu of hardware randomness from, say, /dev/random?
> "/dev/random should be suitable for uses that need very
> high quality randomness such as one-time pad or key
> generation."
> -/dev/random man page

But this is from /dev/random itself and hence is a rather
'subjective' opinion. (Cf. a manufacturer's booklet on its

M. K. Shen

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