Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card.
From: Giorgio (giorgio_at_bignami.zzn.com)
Date: 07/30/04
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Date: 30 Jul 2004 02:17:21 -0700
cesarbremer@raseac.com.br (Cesar Bremer Pinheiro) wrote in message news:<4c3656f.0407290903.2ab5096d@posting.google.com>...
> I agree with you. I implemented One Time Pad under AES 256 bits CBC
> random IV, this is an option to the user, only works under the
> symmetric encryption. In our system you can't use OTP alone.
That's good, in the sense that if it's properly implemented you can
reasonably assume that the AES security level is the minimum effort to
crack the system. This is a costless and clever way to provide a
reasonably quantificable security to the worst case, however the point
is that whole system will never be unconditionally sure like the OTP
algorithm element.
This is the reason of diffidence toward OTP in cryptography, maybe in
an ideal case even an average implementation of the system is far more
secure than other systems, but in the worst case it has no advantage
but however you have always to manage the "cost" of pad excange and
protection.
Usually in cryptography works are toward making the system behave
secure in the worst case, not in the best or even in the most
probable.
> About erasing SDCard: In our case, if our client is worried against
> attackers recovering erased data in a SDCard, i think he have a very
> important information inside the SDCard to be protected, and enough
> money to destroy the SDCard after using it.
If you provide this system you should also provide to the user this
information and means for secure deletion (as for the state of art of
data recovery) or secure destruction, in an emergency situation the
user may have not have the time to melt or pulverize the device with
bare hands or such means... implementing secure means to make the
"worst case" less probable is not easy and may be not cheap.
> And about OTP Random data generators. We have a lot of good random
> data generators today in the market, i don't see problems using one of
> them.
There is usually no problem in using those devices i.e. for provide
random data to scientific simulation, but for being used for an OTP
implementation you should make it tamper proof, an attacker should not
be able to open it to replace it with a dummy rng, or to analize the
radiation of the device.
As said, making the worst case less probable is not easy and may be
not cheap, and may require constant update about state of art of
tecnologies that may be used to tamper the whole system (if even those
informations are made public), however, it seem you are aware of the
problem you will encounter in OTP implementation so, good work!
Giorgio
- Previous message: Liwp: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
- In reply to: Cesar Bremer Pinheiro: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
- Next in thread: Andrew Swallow: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
- Reply: Andrew Swallow: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
- Reply: Cesar Bremer Pinheiro: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
- Reply: Mok-Kong Shen: "Re: Erasing an OTP file on a SD card."
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