Re: Against TEMPEST

From: Soundspider (nospam_at_nospam.net)
Date: 06/17/04

  • Next message: Mok-Kong Shen: "Re: Against TEMPEST" 
    Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 21:37:45 GMT

    Guy Macon <http://www.guymacon.com> wrote:

    >
    >Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> says...
    >
    >>...new generations of electro-
    >>mechanical cipher devices, based on lessons learnt from
    >>Enigma etc.
    >
    >>could apparently now be made smaller, lightweight, more
    >>robust and especially able to implement more comprehensive
    >>and sophisticated algorithms (e.g. with more rotors etc. etc.)
    >>without trade-offs of intolerable operating issues in practice.
    >
    >>I like to mention that such devices are mainly intended for
    >>pre-processing of plaintexts for subsequent computer-based
    >>encryption processing (as a means to substantially reduce
    >>and hopefully entirely annihilate the risks from current
    >>TEMPEST technologies), so that they need not necessarily be
    >>designed with a view to replace any computer-based algorithms.
    >
    >Why bother with Enigma-style encryption? I can build an RC4
    >encryption device that runs on fluid power - no electricity
    >- and can even add the "discard the first 256 outputs" and
    >"discard 15 out of every 16 outputs" modifications. Nobody
    >has shown any practical method of attacking such a system, so
    >adding another computer-based encryption level would just be
    >icing on the cake.

    the phrase "nobody has shown" always seems to leave out the ".. as far
    as i've seen in ______ (pick your forum)". A minor but important
    distinction.

    If there were effective methods, nobody is likely to advertise them
    (to what end?), and if there are no successful methods, nobody is
    likely to advertise either since theres nothing to say. (There's the
    obvious cheap shot here about people who have nothing to say but
    yammer on anyway (the media come to mind).. but I digress).

    It also might just mean the obvious: those posting dont know and
    those knowing don't post. (discussion of that is best left to
    alt.looneytunes.conspiracy.theories)

    Just about anything has an effective counter somewhere if somebody
    wants to put enough time and money against it - although the attack
    is probably out-of-band as far as the safeguard is concerned. (a
    counter to a fancy electronic lock is a half ton of explosive - Thats
    not what the lock was designed to counter , but hey, that's not really
    the point is it?) Nobody comes through the door you want them to...
    they come through the door you forgot to lock. All things being equal,
    they will go over, under or through the walls.

    'Spending more money on security simply attracts a higher class of
    threat.' This can be, if nothing else, somewhat entertaining to
    watch.
     

  • Next message: Mok-Kong Shen: "Re: Against TEMPEST"

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