On Open Source
From: Henrick Hellström (henrick.hellstrm_at_telia.com)
Date: 05/23/04
- Next message: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Previous message: timmy: "Re: Limiting RC4 to "40 bit" strength"
- Next in thread: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Mailman: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: An Metet : "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: John A. Malley: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Bodo Moeller: "Re: On Open Source"
- Maybe reply: Henrick Hellström: "Re: On Open Source"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Date: Sun, 23 May 2004 11:44:20 GMT
It has come to my attention that OpenSSL defaults to not validating the
server certificate against root certificates when used for client side
SSL/TLS. I argue that this is a major design flaw with serious security
implications, and furthermore that this is a kind of issue that is not
likely to be caught be the mechanisms (i.e. peer-review) that are
normally considered to make de facto standard open source software more
likely to be secure than non-standard or closed source software.
Premise 1. Client side authentication of the remote host identity is THE
security service you would normally use SSL/TLS for. Getting a
confidential communication channel with message integrity is pointless
unless you have equally strong proof of the identity of the remote peer.
I am tempted to say that using client side SSL/TLS without root
certificates is like buying a Volvo for safety and driving it in 200
km/h without fastening your seat belt.
Premise 2. This kind of issue is likely to be caught by trained
professionals, by professional support/consultancy and in sufficiently
large and active communities consisting of users, possibly with
different backgrounds, but with access to the source code.
Premise 3. This kind of issue is not likely to be caught by open
sourcing the software and relying on peer-review. My argument for this
is that the people that are likely to spot the problem (i.e. the trained
professionals) are not necessarily interesting in seeing it fixed: They
can use the software securely anyway since they know what to do, and it
is not unlikely that they make a living from knowing this kind of
things. The latter might even entail a direct interest in the problem
NOT being fixed.
Conclusion: Recommending non-experts to use a de facto standard Open
Source solution for cryptographic services is not necessarily good
advice. Recommending them to learn more/hire an expert (or better yet
more than one expert)/participate in relevant community groups is good
advice.
- Next message: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Previous message: timmy: "Re: Limiting RC4 to "40 bit" strength"
- Next in thread: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Tom St Denis: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Mailman: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: An Metet : "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: John A. Malley: "Re: On Open Source"
- Reply: Bodo Moeller: "Re: On Open Source"
- Maybe reply: Henrick Hellström: "Re: On Open Source"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]
Relevant Pages
|