Re: Pin generation algorithm question
From: Peter Fairbrother (zenadsl6186_at_zen.co.uk)
Date: 04/24/04
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Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2004 02:48:21 +0100
Ernst Lippe wrote:
> One obvious solution is to simply keep a list of all currently valid numbers
> at the central server, and to remove a number from this list when it has been
> used.
You would probably want to keep a record of the number and it's use, for a
while, to help detect cheating.
> One of the remarks that I made was that such a list is a big security
> risk. Such a list has a very high monetary value so it will be very difficult
> to secure it.
Sure the list is a big target. Alternatively, the keys would be a big
target. What's the difference? You can fit either on a USB pen drive.
You have to have a big, valuable target somewhere, you can't avoid it. How
are keys better?
What are the advantages of using a cryptographic solution? I really can't
see any. Quick checks don't have any value I can see. Secure decentralised
verification isn't possible with a 16 digit token. Did I miss something?
-- Peter Fairbrother
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