Re: about formal verification of cryptographic protocols
From: Mark Shelor (mshelor_at_comcast.removeme.net)
Date: 01/16/04
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Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2004 00:42:44 -0700
adm wrote:
> i am undergraduate student ,,and i like to do my project on the
> "formal verification of cryptographic protocols".Can you people help
> me giving some idea about the subject ,,is it easy ,feasible, which
> way i should go ,,.i would really appreciate your suggestions also .
You might want to investigate Joshua Guttman's strand space theory.
Since the initial discoveries of flaws in the Needham-Schroeder protocol
in the mid '90s, Joshua and his colleagues at MITRE have developed
methods that either (1) prove that a candidate protocol cannot fail, or
(2) find failures if they exist.
Though somewhat formal, his "Security Protocol Design via Authentication
Tests" provides an elegant and useful illustration of their design
methodology and strand space formalism. You can view the paper at:
http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/guttman/at_design.pdf
Regards, Mark
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