Re: Provable security against differential cryptanalysis

From: Foo Bar (foobar965_at_hotmail.com)
Date: 10/31/03

  • Next message: John E. Hadstate: "Re: counter mode and data integrity" 
    Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2003 10:32:43 GMT

    "Tom St Denis" <tomstdenis@iahu.ca> writes:

    > "Benjamin Choi" <nospam@technosoft21.com> wrote in message
    > news:7eeb3109.0310300445.27a3d131@posting.google.com...
    > > I read that provable security against differential cryptanalysis can
    > > be achieved using a Feistel cipher in which the F-function is itself a
    > > series of Feistel rounds. However, for the cipher to be secure, how
    > > strong must the internal cipher be? Is there some general way to
    > > determine roughly the difficulty of applying differential
    > > cryptanalysis to a particular cipher based on the number of rounds of
    > > that cipher and the strength in the mini-Feistel making up the
    > > F-function?
    >
    > Don't use a feistel. That being said the design of recursive feistels is
    > actually a design of Matt Blaze [turtle] which I accidentaly copied [TC5] a
    > while later.

    Don't forget MISTY by Matsui. I actually don't know which of MISTY and
    Turtle was first, but the Turtle paper cites Matsui.

    /FB 

    -- 
Foo Bar (foobar965@hotmail.com)
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