Re: RSA modulus from e and d
From: Colin Andrew Percival (cperciva_at_sfu.ca)
Date: 09/27/03
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Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2003 00:14:13 +0000 (UTC)
Santa Claus <santa@northpole.gov> wrote:
> That is right. Even if phi(N) is available, I am still in the dark about
> the feasibility of this job in the case of an RSA modulus, likely to have
> been selected as the product of two large primes - for a 1,024-bit modulus
> N built that way, the phi(N) factoring above is not a realistic option,
> right?
Absolutely. While it is theoretically possible, it's usually going to
take a very long time.
Colin Percival
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