Re: [Diehard] Overlap sum test

From: Mok-Kong Shen (mok-kong.shen_at_t-online.de)
Date: 09/25/03


Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2003 10:56:38 +0200


Cristiano wrote:
>
> Danilo Gligoroski wrote:
> > "Cristiano" wrote:
> >
> > If they fail too on OST (overlaping sum test), then the test is at
> > least buggy, or totaly wrong, and Marsaglia should seriousely consider
> > that.
>
> Have you seen his recent post? He posted the correction function.
> I tested several generators using that correction and now the test is good.

Congratulation to you and Gligoroski for having spent so
much effort and work that finally led to the discovery of
an essential coding error in one of the popular software of
interest to quite a number of readers in our group.

Concerning the general issue of program correctness, I like
to quote from a post of someone in another group who quoted
yet another person:

   Fortunately the use of cryptographic programs has become
   more widespread and more people use crypto software today
   protecting their privacy on the Internet than five years
   ago. Unfortunately with crypto products developing they
   have become more and more complex and intransparent,
   leaving the user in fatal dependence on crypto code almost
   nobody fully understands nor analyses for security riscs.
   Most people have inevitably accepted this situation and do
   not really know what exactly they are doing when they use
   crypto software, even though the basic principles are
   widely known and the source code is of course open to
   inspection and peer review. But as the code grows more and
   more complex, it is simply beyond the state of the art to
   analyse such complex code with respect to all its security
   implications and it is no wonder, that it is being used
   with nothing more than a faint hope that some expert had
   checked every single line and can be held responsible
   for the security of the software system. Although not
   every single bit of a software system is security relevant
   one can imagine the complexity and interdependency of
   current versions of GnuPG (54100 lines of C code) and
   PGP-6.5 (294100 lines of C code) compared to classic
   PCP (23600 lines of C code).

Those who have ever the experience of looking at a relatively
small piece of code written by someone else but couldn't
understand it despite thinking and re-thinking many many
and many times would certainly lack the courage to even
take a single glance at the source of any software package
of the order of magnitude examplified above, I suppose.

M. K. Shen



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