Re: A new public key algorithm based on avalanche properties

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Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2003 17:47:51 -0400

Hi Tom,

  No you didn't burst my bubble. I was able to propose some new,
and as yet, un-rebutted, ideas.

  This current version seems to me to be secure. Again I could well
be missing something. I hope my post of last night: Tue, 17 Jun 2003
00:53:10 -0400 a was clear enough explanation. No one has
proposed a means of attacking this latest one yet. I expect someone will,
though.
I just haven't thought of one yet. (Scott has found a few in the past)

This public key exchange layered/avalanche idea seems to weirdly stay
alive,
even though Scott has successfully rebutted several reincarnations of it.
I guess I am looking for either a working version, or a proof of
impossibility.

  My problem is not with you attacking my ideas. I've had lots of lousy
ideas
that deserve attacking. (and a few good ones) And many of my ideas have not
been
stated clearly at first.

  And yes, I went to college. I was quite the math whiz.
(advance-placed a year in math and physics, and took graduate math as a
freshman. Instructor asked me to crack the book sometime, as I was
inventing
new proofs on the fly, but gave me an A+). But I never had the urge to go
around clubbing people on the head with it.

   And no, I didn't take the route of "discover amazing cipher, post it,
flame people". If you recall, you flamed me first with a personal attack.
And yes, I try to be responsible. I have never claimed that my recent
public
key exchange attempt was secure, quite the opposite if you read my comments
and posts. I wanted other opinions. But opinions that I could do something
about. Not just "go away, amateur".

  -Jim

On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 15:18:33 GMT, Tom St Denis <tomstdenis@iahu.ca> wrote:

> Jim Steuert wrote:
>> 1) GF(2^n) Diffie-Hellman (Jan 2003)
>> ====================================
>> I've gotten some good responses here, but Tom didn't like it.
>> I reported that my tests show that it is 4X faster
>> than GF(p) exponentiation for equivalent security
>> with 32-bit multiply processor, and much faster for machines
>> with 16-bit-multiply processors, and even supplied code.
>> Yet Tom discounted it. Note that none of this is my idea,
>> I got the idea from a book, I just raised the question and
>> did the research/coding/tests. Of course there is a whole
>> industry based on the much-slower RSA.
>
> Admitedly at first I didn't know how fast it would be but there are more
> objections to GF(2)[x] then GF(p) for DH. First off the attacks are
> better which means you need bigger keys [larger ciphertext, signatures].
> Second is the widespread use of GF(p). Many people [who are smarter than
> I am] use GF(p) for various reasons [including the fact its just harder
> to attack].
>
> And so what, I didn't like it. That's not an "attack on you". I'm just
> some twirp kid with an opinion.
>
>> 2) David Wagner and my "generic feistel cipher with hash ..." idea (May
>> 2001):
>> ===============================================================================
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Here Tom pontificated: "designing ciphers by a hobbyist is a really bad
>> idea".
>
> And you probably said "... jews deserved it." at some point too.
>
> Taking anything out of context is certainly one [albeit incorrect] way to
> prove a point. What I was tying to say [hmm seems I have to explain even
> the basic of sentiments like 100x times here... whoa] was that amateurs
> should not design ciphers and claim them as secure.
>
>> That is typical of the self-serving elitist crap that comes from self-
>> proclaimed
>> experts. So that did it for me. Practical security is some elusive
>> mathematical
>> holy grail? We need to pass our ciphers by some guru witch-doctor
>> who blesses them? Well, I knew there had to be a better way.
>> Secure encryption should be like an off-the-shelf electronic part.
>>
>> Tom finally deferred to David Wagner.
>
> David's failure to find an attack doesn't mean a whole lot. While he is
> an expert cryptographer with a well established track record just because
> one person can't break a design doesn't mean anything.
>
> Again you're just taking my posts out of contexts and backwards to try
> and prove some wild-ass point.
>
> First off, I, MYSELF, design ciphers. However, whenever I share my
> design I always remind the group that its an amateur design and should be
> avoided in fielded systems. See that's called responsible. Something
> you are not.
>
> Second, I never [at least] mean to discourage amateurs from exploring the
> field. I *DO* discourage amateurs from taking the typical route of
> "discover amazing cipher, post it, flame people" which is essentially
> what you are doing.
>
> If you really want to learn crypto do what the experts suggest. Learn
> the attacks. You're going to learn a heck of a lot more if you
> understand why something is insecure instead of wasting your time with
> useless designs nobody wants anyways.
>
> I'm sorry if I burst your bubble but honestly what did you expect? That
> we would hail your design for all the technical merit it doesn't deserve?
> You're some amateur newbie without a clue. You're not going to design
> leading edge crypto [yet]. Sorry to brake that to you.
>
> I mean did you walk into college [you went to college?] and boom assume
> you're a professor? You have to work up to it.
>
> So yes, if you think learning things the traditional way is "elitist BS"
> then I guess you can call me Tommy-Boy-Elitist-BS St Denis Esquire.
>
> Tom BEBS St Denis Esq.
>
>

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