Re: HELP, Vulnerability in Debit PIN Encryption security, possibly

From: Ernst Lippe (ernstl-at-planet-dot-nl_at_ignore.this)
Date: 05/08/03 

Date: Thu, 08 May 2003 11:35:58 +0200

On Wed, 07 May 2003 21:52:02 +0000, contact wrote:

> This is getting to be a nice long thread but I have to respond to one of
> your items.
>
> "Ernst Lippe" <ernstl-at-planet-dot-nl@ignore.this> wrote in message
> news:b9bh07$chk$1@reader11.wxs.nl...
>> On Wed, 07 May 2003 12:48:38 +0000, contact wrote:
> -----SNIP-----
>>
>> An important advantage of smartcards over magstripe cards
>> is that they cannot be copied.
>>
>
> Isn't that what they once said about Visa holograms? Can't be copied?
Technically, copying a smartcard is theoretically feasible but it
requires a big investment and a lot of very specialized knowledge.
Even when you are able to copy smartcards, it will require lots
of other investments before you are able to make any real money
with this. Economically, it is a very bad investment because the
costs are very high and the actual chances of success are very
low.

As far as I know there are no documented cases
systems where criminals have been able to attack the
smartcard itself. In all cases that I have seen where
smartcards have been copied this was only possible because
there were major flaws in the rest of the system, e.g.
the GSM crypto protocol.

> I still think the best and cheapest way is using a magstripe and a PIN with
> a well structured system.
But it's even cheaper to eliminate the magstripe as well.

> And if designed correctly, every PIN entry device
> would have a different seed key and every transaction would use a different
> key, and no one should be able to access it at any point along the way. But
> then again, I don't own a bank. :-)
I think that is pretty much what happens with our debit cards.

In my opinion, you are seriously under-estimating smartcards.
Of course they are no magic bullet, but they are orders of
magnitude more secure than magstripes.

greetings,

Ernst Lippe