Re: General help with XP, EFS, and Domain
- From: "Steve Riley [MSFT]" <steve.riley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 7 May 2008 20:50:21 -0700
How can I mitigate this risk?
Alas, it's the answer you don't want to hear: use an enterprise CA. Why do you not want to do this?
--
Steve Riley
steve.riley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://blogs.technet.com/steriley
http://www.protectyourwindowsnetwork.com
"AJ Harper" <andyjharper@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message news:9c9543e9-fb59-4ff6-9232-99a83f369b8c@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Greetings,
Bear with me if this is a longer post. I have a need to allow XP
machines in my domain to encrypt data via EFS but also allow the
domain admins to recover the data in a emergency. We don't want to
institute an Enterprise CA. So, I have created a cert and private key
via the cipher command and imported that into my default domain
policy. However, when a user encrypts his/her files it also looks
like a key is created locally (unique to the user). This isn't an
issue except I've seen software out there that claims it can break
encryption as long as the local keys haven't been tampered with or the
password/SAM file is available.
How can I mitigate this risk? If I export the local cert and private
key and then select the option to remove the private key if
successful, then they need to import it again to open the files. They
can't do this every time. What is the best option for my scenario and
at the same time make those EFS recovery products useless? Do I just
use another product like TrueCrypt and develop a process that way?
Thanks for any help anyone can provide.
.
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- General help with XP, EFS, and Domain
- From: AJ Harper
- General help with XP, EFS, and Domain
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