Re: Least User Priviledges for Network Administrators
- From: "Steven L Umbach" <n9rou@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2007 19:17:13 -0500
Sounds like you have a good plan Tom and if you have the buyin and support
of management that is key. Unfortunately in a previously loose running shop
usually a few examples need to be made of violators before the rest realize
the powers that be are serious about what they say and things will start
getting better.
It makes sense to have a chain of command and approval policy to keep things
united and consistent though it does slow progress at first. Stick to your
plan and you will find that fine line to make it work about as well as it
possibly can between policy and technical solutions.
Good luck!
Steve
"Thomas M." <NoEmailReplies@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:OaoFZFyFIHA.5208@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
We're working on some of the things that you mentioned. We already have
the computer use policies, software purchasing policies, security
policies, etc. For reasons that I don't entirely understand (I've only
been here 18 months) that group has historically been able to get away
with ignoring such policies. However, there has recently been a change in
upper management--both within the Network Technology group, and at the top
of the organization as a whole--and the new management team is really
driving the process of tightening down security. So things are changing
for the better.
I also have thought about using the Restricted Software group policy, but
there are a couple of hurdles to clear before I can leverage that
solution. The first hurdle was that no one in our organization gets access
to group policies without first completing intermediate level classes on
AD and Group Policy (a sensible quality control measure). I already had
the skills, but I still had to complete the classes to get permissions to
start using group policies, and I just completed those requirements about
3 weeks ago. Since then, I've been working on getting our AD cleaned up
and creating a proper OU structure that will allow us to really leverage
the power of group policies. Finally, historically, my employer has been
mainly a Novell shop at the enterprise network level (Windows on the
desktop) and we use Novell tools for all of our software distribution,
except for Windows patches where we use WSUS. We have an enterprise
policy that requires me to get Group Policy approved as an accepted
enterprise standard for software distribution, which we are working on.
So things are moving in the right direction, but we do have a little way
to go before we can really start using the Restricted Software group
policy. In the mean time, I have run some software inventory reports
using our Novell tools and those reports have been distributed to each
bureau chief, so they've been working on cleaning up some of the installed
software on desktops.
I suspect that you're right about the fact that the users in the Network
Technology group will probably end up having admin rights to local
machines. I have a meeting scheduled for next week with the section
supervisors from that group and some of the employees in the trenches to
more clearly define what they do on a day-to-day basis, and to hopefully
find some middle ground. But honestly, I'm not too hopeful that there
will be a middle ground. I suspect that those users will need to be local
admins.
--Tom
"Steven L Umbach" <n9rou@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:%2343EG6mFIHA.5544@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Looks like I may have over estimated that group. As you mention it sounds
like a big part of the problem has been management so if you have the
ears of the powers that be it would be good to institute computer use
policy that defines specific can and can not with spelled out
disciplinary action possibilities but to be effective the policy needs to
be enforced. Such computer use policies are as essential as computer
technical policies.
Again it still may be from very difficult to impossible to have users in
that group not be local administrators due to the nature of their work.
An additional item I want to mention is to look into the user of Software
Restriction Policies to manage what they can run and install on their
computers. Maybe you could have the better disciplined users not that
locked down so that they could try new tools and software that could then
be approved for the rest of the users. Software Restriction Policies can
be enforced for local administrators also BUT local administrators are
exempt from Software Restriction policies while in Safe Mode but the user
most likely would not know that.
Steve
"Thomas M." <NoEmailReplies@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:%23KyzyGmFIHA.2004@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sorry for the delay in response. I've been out sick for the last few
days.
While I understand the thrust of your comments, I also believe that one
of your assumptions is at least partially flawed. You stated that the
users in our Network Technology group are most likely, "people that you
already trust." Trust how? Do we trust them to maintain network
equipment? Yes. Do we trust them to observe proper security practices
on the desktop, and to NOT install unlicensed versions of software? No.
In fact, improper desktop security practices and the installation of
unlicensed software occur within our Network Technology group at a rate
that is far beyond that of any other group of users. It is fair to say
that as a group they have a spotty record when it comes to following
enterprise desktop security standards and policies, and they have run
afoul of software licensing requirements. Management is partly to blame
for the situation because until now they have done nothing to crack down
on that kind of behavior. So, in a sense, we don't trust them because
they've proven that a certain level of distrust is appropriate.
That being said, I do not believe that any of them would do anything
malicious, so in that respect we do trust them. The question then
becomes, how do we allow them to do their jobs with the least amount of
disruption and inconvenience, and still insure that desktop security
standards are enforced, and that they're not installing just any old
software that they download from the Internet?
Maybe with XP SP2, that balance just can't be achieved, and if that's
the case then I guess we'll have to live with that fact. At the same
time, my job is to try to find a way to institute the security standards
of the enterprise without crushing their ability to do their jobs. So,
I need to do my due diligence and try to find a creative solution. One
example of a creative solution is what we did with our Web programmers.
Some of their tools do require administrative rights, so we took those
tools off the desktop and moved them to a virtual server. The
programmers have full administrative rights within the virtual
environment, but are only standard users on the desktop. Maybe
something similar would work for our Network Technology group, and maybe
not, but these are the kinds of solutions that I need to consider.
--Tom
"Steven L Umbach" <n9rou@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:%23sjYY5fEIHA.5044@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
While implementing the principle of least privilege is a noble goal I
think you might be over doing it with that group of users. Most likely
they are all highly trained competent people very knowledgeable about
computers and people you already trust as they have access to very
sensitive areas of your network.
Consider the unintended consequences of trying to limit such a group
which could include reduced productivity, missing deadlines, bad for
morale, and they feeling untrusted and incompetent. Also being a local
administrator does not give a user any additional access to the domain
assuming basic best practices for securing the domain are being used..
I am all for PLUP for the average user that will try to install harmful
software on their computer which could even lead to a backdoor to your
network, disable Windows Updates because they read somewhere it would
slow their computer down, change settings they know nothing about,
disable malware protection because they can not access some stupid
website, creating shares so their buddy can access their computer, etc.
All this can greatly impact their productivity and increase IT costs
cleaning up the mess.
Having said that the ways you can increase a regular users access is so
modify access control lists [registry/NTFS], grant permissions to
needed services [can be done via Group Policy], add to privileged
groups other than administrators, and to grant user rights above what
regular users have [via Group Policy]. Unfortunately there are many
tasks that simply can not be granted to a regular user no matter what
you try as usually evidenced by object access failures in the security
log when auditing of object access is enabled. There is not set plan so
you will have to do a ton of trial and error footwork to see if you can
accomplish what you want but I am doubtful it can be done with the
needs of your network technology group. Training users that need
administrator access to logon as a regular user and then use runas when
they need admin powers is a good practice.
tp://blogs.msdn.com/aaron_margosis/archive/2004/07/24/193721.aspx --
this may be of interest
.
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