Re: Is it possible to prevent ownership replacing in a forest?

From: Miha Pihler [MVP] (mihap-news_at_atlantis.si)
Date: 01/13/05


Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 11:31:36 +0100


>> There are quite few attacks
>> against the forest possible if users have physical access to domain
>> controllers even if these domain controllers are only for child domain.
>> If
>> these users are also (child) domain administrators these attacks can be
>> carried out in even simpler manner. Child domain administrator could take
>> ownership of the forest...
> Could you outline how it could be done? My personal mail is
> gera@lukrecija.lt
> Is it regular way using standard tools or some type of hacking
> manipulating
> SID history and a like?

As you mention SID history it is one of the easiest ways to become
Enterprise Administrators. There are tools available that will do most of
the work for you. All you need to do is reboot the server (which would
usually require physical access to the server. It is also possible to do
this over IP switch (KVM over IP) even if you don't have physical access...)

So few things to consider when planning your domain/forest:
* Physical security of the servers (also protection of boot sequence, ...).
* If you need high(er) security of your environment (and you can't trust
your administrators) think about multiple forests and trusts between the
forests.

Using Security Identifier (SID) Filtering to Prevent Elevation of Privilege
Attacks
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/administration/security/sidfilter.asp

-- 
Mike
Microsoft MVP - Windows Security 


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