Re: Deloder worm has resurfaced. Watch your privacy!
From: Kyle Lai (kyle@kylelai.com)
Date: 03/31/03
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From: kyle@kylelai.com (Kyle Lai) Date: 30 Mar 2003 20:45:17 -0800
"Nick FitzGerald" <nick@virus-l.demon.co.uk> wrote in message news:<3e863279@clear.net.nz>...
> "Kyle Lai" <kyle@kylelai.com> to me:
>
> > > There are good reasons why measured analyses of Deloder do not include
> > > the password information. Further, there are compelling ethical
> > > reasons for them to not include that information. The rest of your
> > > analysis is a good and useful contribution, but it and your ethical
> > > reputation are spolied by a couple of sentences.
> >
> > I disagree. I think you missed the point. Plus, I don't think
> > anti-virus vendors looked at registry values other than the "start-up"
> > registry values.
>
> Why are you so obsessed with registry settings? And it is you that has
> missed the point.
>
> AV products in general do _not_ look at registry settings _AS A
> DETECTION METHOD_. And there are very good reasons for that. No vendor
> can afford the false positive and false negative rate "depending" on
> such detection methods would produce. Such items are indeed useful in
> manually handling incidents and knowledge of them is often necessary to
> "fix" machines that have been "infected" (though with this kind of
> compromise, it is generally best advice -- against the history of the
> AV industry's approach -- to "burn and rebuild" as you can guarantee
> that folk dumb enough to get hit by something like Deloder will not have
> taken enough of the necessary preparatory steps to be able to assuredly
> determine after the fact whether the rest of their box has not been
> seriously compromised with other, as yet undetected backdoors, stealthing
> rootkits, etc.
>
> Anyway -- we can easily disagree about the desirability of using registry
> values for programmatic malware detection and we can debate that till the
> cows come home. However, you did not address my main point which is that
> your publication of the VNC password used by Deloder is unethical and
> therefore irresponsible and unprofessional. Your point that describing
> the gory details of the registry settings is useful does not, in and of
> itself justify your further compromising of security of the claimed
> 140,000+ machines that have been infected with Deloder. Were the VNC
> password stored in clear text in the registry then a decision to publish
> that registry value would be equally problematic given there are plenty of
> other diagnostics people can use.
>
> Surely you understand that as the VNC password is a purely arbitrary side-
> effect of a malware writer's choice at some point in history, _AND_
> knowing it adds precisely nothing to the end-users' ability either to
> "protect" themselves or to remove Deloder should they have been infected
> already (these are, you claim, your main motivations in releasing the
> analysis) the specific value to your target audience of knowing that
> password is _ZERO_. So your publication of it really only significantly
> helps others than those you claim were the intended benefactors of your
> work. Further, it is obviously highly likely that the only people who will
> be greatly helped by your effort are those with intent to maliciously use
> the machines of innocent people affected by Deloder. As that is such an
> obvious conclusion, I restate my charge that it was recklessly unethical
> and professionally irresponsible of you to publish the password information.
>
> > If public did not get informed about the true problem and exploit, and
> > what the worm has done, how can they protect themselves from the
> > variants of this worm, which always happens? ...
>
> They cannot.
>
> But, if you think about it for a few seconds, they do not need to know
> precisely what the worm does. In fact, it would be better if they had a
> broader, more general appreciation of security issues than a temporary,
> highly focussed view on this incident. Drawing such detailed focus to this
> particular worm runs the risk of people deciding that because their
> password is not in the list that Deloder uses, then they are "safe". This
> is precisely the same sort of security-blind "knowledge enhancement" people
> who suggest, hearing that a terrible virus payload is due to trigger on,
> say 1 April, seriously suggest that a reasonable approach is to not use our
> computers on that day "just to be sure".
>
> And face it -- do you really think people with null and such obvious admin
> passwords as those used by Deloder (and let's get honest here -- what
> proportion of Deloder-hit machines have other than a null admin password?
> Probably about 1% of them, yeah?) are either going to read your analysis or
> even care that they are infected? Those that use antivirus or anti-Trojan
> software who were hit before they got their update that detected it will
> simply clean it and go on their way. Whether they have an unwanted VNC
> installation left on their machine is actually something they don't care
> about, because even if they did remove VNC, they will have left their admin
> password blank and their Windows Network bound to their external Internet
> interface for no good reason. These people will always exist and they will
> always pose just this kind of risk to the rest of a public sewer-style
> network such as the Internet. If you want to change that, you have to
> design and implement a different Internet.
>
> > ... In addition, if people
> > don't get the information on what EXACTLY the worm did, how do you
> > know what proper actions to take to protect end-users?
>
> As I've already said, people do not need to know "exactly" what the worm
> did. They need to know enough to determine if it is likely they have it or
> have had it and, if it has been removed, whether any "collateral damage"
> remains and if so what the best course of action is. And, in fact,
> although you claim to have provided this "exact" information, I find your
> analysis quite incomplete and only partial. Of course, few people would
> want a sub-routine by sub-routine description of _exactly_ what the program
> does, but you rightly understand that and provided a generally good
> condensation of the important points to a reasonable level of detail for
> most likely readers of your analysis.
>
> However, that still does not justify the unethical release of the password,
> as described in detail in my previous message and above...
>
> > CERT advisory, http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-08.html,
> > mentioend that 140,000 connections on an IRC network, which are the
> > systems infected with Deloder type of worms.
>
> How do you know that they are Deloder-ed systems? CERT claims that the
> 140,000+ network was a GT-bot network and as these IRC-controlled bot-nets
> usually use a specific IRC channel (or group of channels) they presumably
> made that claim because the channel(s) involved were configured in GT-bot
> samples retrieved from some of the affected machines. As GT-bot is not
> normally spread via open or weak-passworded Windows shares, I fail to see
> how CERT's claim of a 140,000+ GT-bot network translates to 140,000+
> possible Deloder infections.
>
> > If you think the advisories and analysis are generated good awareness,
> > why are there still so tens of thousands of computers out there
> > infected with Deloder and other worms and Trojans, and why aren't they
> > doing anything about it?
>
> I've answered that above.
>
> In short, most of the people running those machines simply don't care
> enough...
>
> > That's why I published my article.
>
> ...and it will fail to "help" any more than all those previous ones as the
> people whose machines remain the problem are no more likely to see your
> advisory or be swayed into caring enough as a result of seeing it than they
> are to see any of the others.
Hi Nick,
You missed the point again. Registry is not as important as what you
have point out: people should know that AV vendors do NOT check for
everything a virus/worm/Trojan infects. And the point is, if you
don't know the damage of a Trojan/worm, e.g. a Trojan set a encrypted
password in your system to allow anyone to get in, then you can't
think like a hacker, and you wouldn't know what they have done, and
you can't plan for the right move the next time...
Cheers,
/Kyle
KLC Consulting, Inc.
www.klcconsulting.net
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