Re: Biometrics



1. True

2. That is true but XP and even Vista are totally focused on external
security. Can Microsoft remotely work on a Microsoft Windows 98 Second
Edition computer via India like Microsoft can work on a Windows XP
Professional computer? Microsoft has done remote access work on the XP side
of my dual-boot computer which is in NTFS. My computer has a Western Digital
Hard Drive in Fat 32 on C: and a separate hard drive on D: with Windows XP
Professional.

3. I have tried out Ubuntu Linux within a Windows environment within XP
Professional. I have run Windows Virtual PC 2007 within Windows XP
Professional. It is great but it does not fully meet my needs as a consumer.
Consumers want to play games. My friend Chris from camp is going to build a
98 Second Edition computer with my old motherboard. He wants to play old dos
games that he enjoys. The nice thing about 98 Second Edition is that you can
exit to MS-DOS mode. This allows gamers to play games. It is all in the
Microsoft articles about compatibility.

http://www.aumha.org/win4/a/resource.php

http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=146418

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Steve Riley [MSFT]" wrote:

You are asserting that one single vulnerability allows "military and top
secrets to be leaked" and thus requires the use of some other operating
system. You simply cannot make this assertion, for two reasons.

1. NO ONE KNOWS whether your suggested operating system has the same
vulnerability.

2. ALL software has vulnerabilities, many of which allow attackers to take
control of a system. Establishing good security practices (patch when we
release, install only the services you need, apply the principle of least
privilege to data, and so on) is MORE important than the particular piece of
technology you've chosen to deploy. And the older the software is, the more
difficult it is to manage and the more likely it is to get attacked --
because older software was not written to be centrally-managed (no group
policy and no machine identity in 9x, for instance) and was not written with
resiliency in mind.

And this talk of "internal safety" regarding 9x is really nonsensical. Vista
and even XP+SP3 are FAR more difficult to attack than 9x was. We at
Microsoft have the benefit of about 10 years of historical data from Watson
reports (online crash analysis, Windows error reporting). We can divine a
lot of information about attacks from this data. Whereas in the past most
attacks were targeted at the operating system, this is no longer true. The
majority of crashes we see now come from third-party software installed on
the box. And in this case, crashes are good: various features in the
operating system (DEP, ASLR, SRP, and more) have detected that something
malicious is happening, and stop it before the attack succeeds. You could
never do that with an OS as simple as 9x.


--
Steve Riley
steve.riley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://blogs.technet.com/steriley
http://www.protectyourwindowsnetwork.com



"Dan" <Dan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:1D0AF19C-B164-450F-92D3-96F6E1E9FDA6@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
I see your point Steve but US-Cert maintains that all NT source code is
vulnerable thus my point being valid about having 98 Second Edition
machines
within a network for internal safety reasons and potentially to act as
gateways. How can we allow our military and top secrets to be leaked.
Please see the United States Computer Readiness Team at the Department of
Homeland Security and so you can see how I am getting at the true value of
a
source code that is flexible enough to offer external security, internal
safety, and more. Thus we have a source code matrix as presented below.
I
am not skilled enough to write the code for this yet but I bet Microsoft
and
others are.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

NT= New Technology --- outer defense network

9x = Internal Safety --- based upon DOS as maintenance operating system --
lacking in XP and Vista --- no true maintenance operating system according
to
Chris Quirke, MVP --- Vista is indeed great on security issues but still
lacks in compatibility as the FAA has mentioned only using Windows 2000
(which I like as well --- totally old-school reminds me of Windows 98
Second
Edition) as well XP machines (which are good but too vulnerable in this
day
and age due to the large surface area created by too many services and not
having strong enough default settings within Internet Explorer -- another
reason to separate the browser from Windows like the Justice Department
mentioned rightly in the 1998 case although Apple should be investigated
now
for the practice of tying Quick time with Itunes and I feel this practice
of
tying software must be banned for safety and security reasons in the
future.)

Unix/Linux/Mozilla/etc. --- third party programs and open source
technologies mingling as one with closed proprietary software which is
protected by IP. Thank you for continuing this discussion.


-------------------------------------------from us
cert------------------------

Vulnerability Note VU#800113
Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning
Overview
Deficiencies in the DNS protocol and common DNS implementations facilitate
DNS cache poisoning attacks.


http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/MIMG-7DPJ7W (Microsoft NT but not 9x
vulnerable)


http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/MIMG-7ECLCY (Ubuntu vulnerable)

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/MIMG-7ECL5Z (Apple unknown whether
vulnerable)

I am sure you know see that 3 dans --- 2 on that website and myself
another
Dan have helped bring this issue to light about how critical it is ---
kind
of boggles the mind doesn't it ---- good reason to bring 98 Second Edition
and/or another variant 9x/NT/Unix source code --- on-line --- Microsoft is
the only one that has the resources to do this and the whole world now
needs
your help -- Thank You for seeing the Light of our current situation
within
the Defense Network.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------



"Steve Riley [MSFT]" wrote:

A standalone telephone certainly is secure, and keeps its users safe. For
such a phone will never receive or transmit unwanted conversations, and
the
users of such phones will never be bothered with advertisements, thoughts
that challenge their perceptions, or interesting and surprising
opportunities.

A standalone computer certainly is secure, and keeps its users safe. For
such a computer will never receive or transmit unwanted software, and the
users of such computers will never be bothered with advertisements,
thoughts
that challenge their perceptions, or interesting and surprising
opportunities.

No risk = no reward.

The value of a networked system increases as the square of the number of
elements in that system. A single system has a value of 1^2=1; a
two-element
network has a value of 2^2=4; a three element network has a value of
3^2=9;
and so on. (Bob Metcalfe, "It's all in your head," Forbes Magazine, 7 May
2007: http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0507/052.html.)

Chris's distinction between the Internet and "a network" (presumably
private, for Chris doesn't specify) isn't useful today. The network
effect
is clearly evident on the Internet; I'd argue that in a private network,
the
network effect is diminished. Why else would we all be rushing headlong
into
the eventual recognition that private corpnets truly belong on the
Internet,
and that continuing to make the distinction means a loss of real business
value? (Scott Charney, "Creating a more trusted Internet,"
http://download.microsoft.com/download/2/f/7/2f752ae4-7e1d-4dbd-b75a-aa2dcb0eff5b/End_to_End_Trust_Statement_of_Purpose_Charney.pdf;
Steve Riley, "Directly connect your corpnet with IPsec and IPv6,"
http://blogs.technet.com/steriley/archive/2008/06/25/directly-connect-to-your-corpnet-with-ipsec-and-ipv6.aspx.)

I quote our own materials here as evidence of the demand from
forward-thinking customers that the industry envision new practices and
develop new technologies that allow for the full realization of the
network
effect. Chris's argument that per-user security "creates artificial
scopes"
doesn't reflect reality. On the contrary, _stronger_ per-user (and
per-machine) identity and authentication are critical for allowing the
network effect to flourish. Indeed, the lack of strong identity and
authentication has been a hindrance, and that's why you see technologies
like smart cards and TPM chips becoming more common. When we reach the
point
where all communications are in the context of validated identities,
carried
in transactions with integrity and confidentiality protection, between
endpoints that mutually authenticate their identities and their
configurations, then who cares whether the underlying network is trusted
or
not?

--
Steve Riley
steve.riley@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://blogs.technet.com/steriley
http://www.protectyourwindowsnetwork.com



.



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