Re: pki - CRL questions



You approach sounds like it may be pretty extreme. You haven't mentioned
why you even want to use PKI. You have decided on the three tier approach,
before you have these other questions answered. I think you might want to
keep an open mind about that part, and design from a services approach
first, then plan your architecture. Making early mistakes with PKI
deployment is expensive.

If you are securing web sites or e-mail that is accessed from the internet,
then you need to make your CRLs accessible from the internet. If you don't
need this now, you probably will in the future. If you ever partner with
other companies, PKI can be a real cost saver. Because of this, you need to
plan early on what URI will be embedded in certificates from the very
beginning.

You sound like you are deploying for a very large organization. You
probably will want to use OCSP (Online certificate status protocol) instead
of CRL. OCSP products from Tumbleweed will give you an amazing amount of
flexibility it this area, and is used by the U.S. military and government.
Microsoft relies on third party solutions for OCSP.

Paul Nelson
Thursby Software Systems, Inc.


in article 9A4A72AB-4203-4555-A81D-D70D22B7B12D@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ben at
Ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote on 11/13/06 9:15 AM:

Designing a basic w2k3 pki for internal purposes. Three tier (root &
intermediate offline, enterprise isuing). Might be expanded to support
external (outside AD forest, outside internal WAN) use in the near future.
Do I need to publish CRL's and AIA to external accessible webservers from
the start, or can I start with internal publishing only?
Can the CRL publishing list be changed for all CAs (external HTTP address
added) without much reconfiguration at a later stage?
What is the preferred order, when using mostly AD integrated clients: ldap
or http first?
I want this design to be flexible, not directly needing an extra layer of
intermediate and issuing CA's when external used certs are needed, but also
want to prevent making irreversible decisions...


.



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