Re: Why not patch all windows and not just legal copies




"Michael Davis (Comcast.Net)" <netguru@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:uofZJtokGHA.1508@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
I disagree with this line on many levels but also see the logic of the
reasoning that leads to it.

briefly,
allowing a reservoir of unpatched computers to remain on the global
network

"allow" is the wrong verb here
As indicated before, you assume patching of binaries that have been
altered into unknown states would work.
Rootkits would have come more and more prevalent no matter what
choice was made on this specific issue.
The systems would have only become modified to not patch key
aspects, if as desired, but to appear to be getting patched. This
is a pattern seen already where one side escalates the efforts (in
you exhortation this would be providing patches to the illicit, which
includes owned, machines) just to see the other deploy countering
neasures.
Again, the real problem is your assumption of "allow"; it is too
presumptive of an actual capability/capacity. More to the point
would have been "choosing not to attempt patching of a . . . "

directly relates to the Polio analogy I used earlier. The only difference
is that the epidemic hot spots are global in scale. Now we are seeing
Webroot and other tools being deployed to detect and manage Malware as
well as seeing our old friends AdAware, Spybot S&D and new friends like
Microsoft Defender completely bamboozled by Malware that loads as kernel
mode / stealth mode root kits with encrypted registry keys.


"now we are seeing" and we would have by now anyway.
A very large percentage of the owned machines are owned due to
user practices and (perhaps not informed) choices/actions.

In a perfect world there would be no pirate systems, in the real world
there are literally millions. HOW do we redress them.

1. dont patch
2. patch
3. block access (simple enough in theory but impossible in practice).

and I am indicating that choice 2 is not so clearly possible.
Yes, a number would/could be patched for this/that/the-next . . .
Again, a critical point to consider is the illicit code is not always just
the genuine binaries with a pilferred key or disabled WPA.

The simple fact is that there is a lot of money in having unpatched
systems around. Since we have to spend money to protect ourselves (what
would the current IT landscape look like if Windows didnt have over
100,000 virus / malware issues). The problem with this worldwiew is that
we are constantly in a reactive mode and dont know what is coming next.
Some believe that SPI firewalls are enough, others understand that no
single technology can protect us from todays environmental malware
vectors.


Consider the MS position. Due to its prior crapware written for
non-networked
systems, etc.. there is a plague on their installed base. If they purchase
and supply
free means for people to deal with this they are being anti-competitive
potentially
putting an entire industry out of business. In an idealized world, where
the redesigned
software engineering process and objectives/priorities now in use might
result in a
totally immunized system, there is a question what the lawyers that believe
themselves
able to make software engineering decisions will attempt in the courts.

Finally,

It's important to remember that the needs of the few are outweighed by the
needs of the many and doing nothing for bootleg OS is doing something to
the

You have totally lost me . . . I attempt to see logic in that but fail.
Who is the few? Those dupped into buying in good faith computer systems
that after the Genuine programs started discovered that they had been taken,
sold a non-genuine, pirated knock-off ??
Who knows what is on those (privacy violating, identity forwarding,
keylogging . . .)
What is the need of those few?
I would say it is the discovery of their peril and getting them to a
position in
which they can have the use of a trustable computing system, which is what
they were in the belief that they did have.

rest of us. Can we harden Windows to resist arbitrary attacks? Lets look
to the past for the answer, where we find a resounding no. Can we shrink
the attack surface? IMHO the answer is yes.

Safety is a user choice issue as much as it is one of the software
involved and choices for that software's default config/behaviors.

Also, the past is often not a good indicator of the present/future.
And, just as this is so for comparing Wilson's America to today's, this is
also so for comparisons of pre-W2k3, pre-XP-SP2 era code to the
current generation. Things really have changed, not perfectly sure, but
changed in very significant ways and extents. On the other hand, I still
wait for the decade where I feel that using sendmail's past as a predictor
for its future is invalid.



its an effort of will and bootleg systems are bots


Perhaps it is time for beniware (mal contra beni)

I was not happy when MS made its intentions known relative to
patch availability. My thinking then was that the decision would
fail to help calm the storm then raging on the network - demons
knocking on every protocol/port, uselessly consumed bandwidth,
etc.. Today I am thinking I did not see some factors about the
larger ecosystem that is Windows on the world network. There
are quite a few people/businesses that now run certifiably real
OS versions, that at the time did not. I know this as I saw many,
many people posting about the scum that had sold them . . .
yada, yada . . . when the genuine tests first deployed. Now,
knowing those that post here are a sliver sized sample of what is
happening out there I can only guess that there are quite a few
people now with real OS bits that otherwise would not have them.
(Yes, genuine program could have said Oh, we see you are running
fake or illicit Windows, we really suggest you pay up and also go
through the pain of getting real bits in use. I do not believe all those
seeing that would have acted on that. I do believe we would be
seeing small businesses and home users "buying" bits with everything
already in place for them to be bot net zombies, identity leaking junk).

There are issues at work that are larger than the ones you have
indicated in your initial and follow-up posts. You are not on the
wrong bandwagon, you just are not seeing all of the road.

Roger

"Roger Abell [MVP]" <mvpNoSpam@xxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:%23JJrlsnkGHA.2280@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The debate raged for a few months over a couple years ago (between
some MSFT people and some MVPs) with the reasoning being much
as some of what you presented - i.e. vast network impacts from illicit
and corrupted systems. That was when automatic updates was just
emerging as an effective force (hmmm, perhaps that raging debate was
more like three years ago now).
There were some surprising reasons presented.
One obvious one that you are apparently overlooking is that it is not
a simple matter to patch something that is not in a known condition
(i.e. a valid patch to valid OS binaries could blow away illicit
binaries);
and that there might be legal issues as a result in some countries.
There were other issues, more subtle than I can recall/repeat.
Now, MS did recognize the parts of the argument about the unhealthy
state of the network globally due to unfit systems, and not much later
brought out the almost free lite versions of XP available in some parts
of the world. Since that time they have also made investments in
anti-malware technologies and you have seen these being rolled out
to legitimate OS owners at from zero to little cost, and they also made
major investment in things pumped into XP via SP2.
While at the time I questioned some of their decisions about leaving
the rogue, illegal systems to fend for themselves. In retrospect now
it seems that they were right. Not only did not making patches available
make "owning" an illegal system less attractive, it has probably also had
an impact on the size of that population (the network sicknesses raged
intensely among the unprotected/unprotectable). At the same time, the
aggressive push to get all legitimate machines made into loyal clients of
the automatic update service seems to have had a vast impact on the
patch-state of legitimate machines on a gross average.

"Michael Davis (Comcast.Net)" <netguru@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:uz8Q5vlkGHA.4224@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
It seems to me that its a bad idea to deny owners of illegal copies of
windows the ability to patch their computers. Windows is running on
hundereds of millions of computers and hundreds of millions of computers
are not being patched. Here are the issues which lead to the perfect
storm we are in right now.

1. Computer programming languages like C that do not check for buffer
overflow (require that the programmer code for buffer overflow checking
within the application itself)

2. monolithic adoption of a singular operating system for servers and
client computing.

3. stolen code for NT 4.0, Windows 2000 and Windows XP.

4. majority of Microsoft code run in pacific rim and former USSR is not
legit

Microsoft Policy requiring validation to patch operating systems.

5. windows available from WAREZ and other download sites, hacked,
infected etc.

6. rapid adoption of new code practices without consideration of the
security consequences

7. botnets composed of compromised systems

8. adware, spyware, malware, virus (to me, if I didnt install it, its a
virus)

9. The Internet and nature of TCP/IP

To fight this perfect storm Billions of dollars are being spent to
simply stay current. Meaning that the legit systems are constantly being
assaulted by botnets comprised of hacked unpatched computers and
networks have to respond to new emerging threats arising from the sea of
unpatched computers.

It is simply prudent to realize the nature of the situation and allow
all windows systems to be patched or at the very least someone should
offer 3rd party alternative patches to bootleg since we know they will
not buy Windows and they are being exploited.







.



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