Re: Testing MS Security Patches?



Your validation needs to be accomplished relative to the essential
applications,
services, and capabilities in your environment.
You could start by developing the list of essentials per your environment.
Then, with a test harness (which might be quite expensive to make "real")
that represents these capabilities of your production environment you would
need to validate the list of essentials after injecting the patches into the
test
machines.
All is much harder done that sketched.

--
Roger Abell
Microsoft MVP (Windows Server : Security)

"y2kbug_s97" <y2kbugs97@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:178C0A5D-51D0-46C6-8243-C3193B0C4871@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Does anyone know of specific tests that should be performed before
> implementing MS security updates on production systems.
>
> I am a member of a large organization and we are trying to enhance our
> testing procedures before implementing MS security patches through out our
> production environments.
>
> Is there a document that shows what specific things should be considered?
>
> I'm looking for a guideline that displays how to validate that a security
> patch released by MS will not break any applications or the Operating
> System.


.



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