Access Control Best Practices for shared hosting seem at odds with Web Site Starters
From: M. M. Rafferty (mmr_at_vistagrande.com)
Date: 09/06/05
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Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 17:53:26 -0700
The MS Shared Hosting Deployment Guide lists among best practices:
Ensure strong permissions are used on Web content
Use separate anonymous (IUSR) accounts for each Web site
Never allow anonymous user (IUSR) Write permission
The document also describes Isolated Shared Web Hosting where each customer
has their own application pool with a unique identity. It states that the
host should "Ensure that the Customer-specific identity has the minimal
necessary permissions to system resources" but exactly what that means in
terms of ACLs apparently has been left as an exercise for the reader.
And therein lies the problem. Or at least part of it.
We are looking at the web site starter kits -- DotNetNuke and the Community
Server. It appears that both require write access for the application pool
identity below the web root. This has also come up in a few other
applications such as shopping carts we have encountered. Usually, the
requirement is to allow content management features, generally image
uploads, via the browser.
How is this not anonymous write access? Why would Microsoft recommend this
to its hosting partners?
Also, another quirk that appears to be the case, at least from what we
encountered in some experiments with the Community Server applications, is
that one seems to require the application pool identity have list permission
starting at the root of the drive all the way down to the web folder. This
seems like a bit of a privacy breach at best since it would rely only on
security through obscurity in our folder naming.
Can someone explain this apparent contradiction?
Ideally, can someone lay out the recommended ACLs for this scenario for a
web host to have in place so that customers' sites are secured and
isolated... and still able to run real ASP.NET applications?
Thanks,
Mary M. Rafferty
- Next message: Wei-Dong XU [MSFT]: "RE: Kerberos Authentication- How to?"
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- Next in thread: Jeff Cochran: "Re: Access Control Best Practices for shared hosting seem at odds with Web Site Starters"
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