Re: securing an assembly

From: SStory (TheStorys_at_TAKEOUTTHISSPAMBUSTERsofthome.net)
Date: 03/15/04

  • Next message: Chris Behrens: "RSA Public / Private Key encryption, RSA.ToXmlString method" 
    Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2004 16:36:06 -0600

    Michel,

    Are you just saying that the public/private key should be guarded somewhere
    off the hard disk?

    I think that is what you mean.

    Even so as undeleted files are recoverable, this doesn't solve it either
    100%.

    Maybe there are no 100% solutions.

    Someone suggested putting this file on a smartcard and keeping that safe. I
    don't know.

    Just my thoughts.

    Shane

    "Michel Gallant" <neutron@NOSPAMistar.ca> wrote in message
    news:uusM9PtBEHA.1600@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl...
    > Shawn,
    > I think that Microsoft has to be very careful to not introduce
    infrastructure (like delayed signing)
    > which can itself very easily lead to incorrect and insecure use.
    > I found SN delayed signing rather confusing at first glance.
    >
    > Actually imo a bigger vulnerability is the fact that any keypairs created
    by sn -k are
    > cleartext PRIVATEKEYBLOBS (as I have posted many times :-)
    >
    > I suspect most teams don't really practice good security .. so BY DEFAULT
    why shouldn't
    > sn.exe generate a pswd-protected keypair file?
    >
    > Regards,
    > - Mitch Gallant
    > MVP Security
    > www.jensign.com
    >
    > ""Shawn Farkas"" <shawnfa@online.microsoft.com> wrote in message
    > news:rUUsIGtBEHA.3552@cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl...
    > > No, if you've set up your development machines to not verify assemblies
    signed with that key
    > (which you have to do in order to work with delay
    > > signed assemblies), then as soon as you release a signed version of the
    assembly, anyone could
    > extract the public key token, and create a new
    > > assembly that has that token. Since verification is turned off for that
    specific token, the
    > malicious person could do whatever they want in their
    > > assembly. Also, since they have the correct public key token, the
    strong name will match what
    > you're expecting. The only obstical remains that
    > > they must find a way to get this modified assembly downloaded onto a
    machine where someone has
    > turned off verification for the token.
    > >
    > > -Shawn
    > > http://blogs.msdn.com/shawnfa
    > >
    > > --
    > >
    > > This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no
    rights.
    > > Note: For the benefit of the community-at-large, all responses to this
    message are best directed
    > to the newsgroup/thread from which they
    > > originated.
    > > --------------------
    > > >From: "SStory" <TheStorys@TAKEOUTTHISSPAMBUSTERsofthome.net>
    > > >References: <EAA195F6-8FE3-42AC-8BE3-A5771C5D15DE@microsoft.com>
    > <O5C4x##7DHA.1052@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl> <O9FP0L
    > > $7DHA.2412@TK2MSFTNGP09.phx.gbl> <O7UvMgF8DHA.2300@TK2MSFTNGP10.phx.gbl>
    > <lejk201po941d1u9gq1ancsf9cpbq6qn9k@
    > > 4ax.com> <#RLDwiL8DHA.3704@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl>
    <uN9jX1hAEHA.1600@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl>
    > <IziS#BxAEHA.604
    > > @cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl>
    > > >Subject: Re: securing an assembly
    > > >Date: Tue, 9 Mar 2004 14:14:15 -0600
    > > >Lines: 192
    > > >X-Priority: 3
    > > >X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
    > > >X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
    > > >X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
    > > >Message-ID: <uSChTLhBEHA.464@TK2MSFTNGP11.phx.gbl>
    > > >Newsgroups: microsoft.public.dotnet.security
    > > >NNTP-Posting-Host: 0-1pool140-179.nas12.nashville1.tn.us.da.qwest.net
    65.135.140.179
    > > >Path: cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl!TK2MSFTNGP08.phx.gbl!TK2MSFTNGP11.phx.gbl
    > > >Xref: cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl microsoft.public.dotnet.security:5331
    > > >X-Tomcat-NG: microsoft.public.dotnet.security
    > > >
    > > >But this means the anyone would have to be a rogue developer inside the
    > > >organization
    > > >who extracted the public key and made his own up right?
    > > >
    > > >Because once I signed it and sent that out, signed, this couldn't
    happen,
    > > >right?
    > > >
    > > >Thanks,
    > > >
    > > >Shane
    > > >
    > > >""Shawn Farkas"" <shawnfa@online.microsoft.com> wrote in message
    > > >news:IziS%23BxAEHA.604@cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl...
    > > >> Hi Shane,
    > > >>
    > > >> The problem the article is pointing out is that a delay signed
    assembly
    > > >does not have a valid signature on it, so it cannot be verified.
    > > >> Because of this, on your development machines you need to turn off
    > > >verification of that assembly. Since anyone can extract a public key
    from a
    > > >> fully signed file, they could then create a replacement assembly that
    does
    > > >something bad and give it the same strong name (since only the public
    > > >> key token is part of the strong name, and they have access to that).
    They
    > > >don't have to get a valid signature onto this malicious assembly, since
    > > >> you've turned off verification.
    > > >>
    > > >> -Shawn
    > > >> http://blogs.msdn.com/shawnfa
    > > >>
    > > >> --
    > > >>
    > > >> This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no
    > > >rights.
    > > >> Note: For the benefit of the community-at-large, all responses to
    this
    > > >message are best directed to the newsgroup/thread from which they
    > > >> originated.
    > > >> --------------------
    > > >> >From: "SStory" <TheStorys@TAKEOUTTHISSPAMBUSTERsofthome.net>
    > > >> >References: <EAA195F6-8FE3-42AC-8BE3-A5771C5D15DE@microsoft.com>
    > > ><O5C4x##7DHA.1052@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl> <O9FP0L
    > > >> $7DHA.2412@TK2MSFTNGP09.phx.gbl>
    <O7UvMgF8DHA.2300@TK2MSFTNGP10.phx.gbl>
    > > ><lejk201po941d1u9gq1ancsf9cpbq6qn9k@
    > > >> 4ax.com> <#RLDwiL8DHA.3704@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl>
    > > >> >Subject: Re: securing an assembly
    > > >> >Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 13:19:26 -0600
    > > >> >Lines: 117
    > > >> >X-Priority: 3
    > > >> >X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
    > > >> >X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
    > > >> >X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165
    > > >> >Message-ID: <uN9jX1hAEHA.1600@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl>
    > > >> >Newsgroups: microsoft.public.dotnet.security
    > > >> >NNTP-Posting-Host: 0-1pool98-163.nas16.nashville1.tn.us.da.qwest.net
    > > >65.144.98.163
    > > >> >Path:
    > >
    >cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl!TK2MSFTNGXA06.phx.gbl!TK2MSFTNGXA05.phx.gbl!TK2MSFTNGP
    0
    > > >8.phx.gbl!tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl
    > > >> >Xref: cpmsftngxa06.phx.gbl microsoft.public.dotnet.security:5247
    > > >> >X-Tomcat-NG: microsoft.public.dotnet.security
    > > >> >
    > > >> >Michel,
    > > >> >
    > > >> >in the SNing article you mention what does the following warning
    mean?
    > > >> >Protecting Your Development Team
    > > >> >Delay signing isn't perfect. Because your team must turn off strong
    name
    > > >> >verification for one or more public keys in order to test their own
    > > >> >assemblies during development, be very careful not to confer trust
    on an
    > > >> >assembly based solely on the presence one of these unverified strong
    > > >names.
    > > >> >Given your public key, an attacker can delay sign a malicious
    assembly
    > > >just
    > > >> >as easily as you can delay sign your own assemblies. And you must
    assume
    > > >> >that any attacker will be able to easily obtain your public key,
    since it
    > > >is
    > > >> >embedded as metadata in each strong-named assembly you build.
    > > >> >
    > > >> >Please tell me what the danger is in this? Is this a danger after
    it is
    > > >> >singed or just if it is released before being signed or what?
    > > >> >
    > > >> >Thanks,
    > > >> >
    > > >> >Shane
    > > >> >
    > > >> >
    > > >> >
    > > >> >"Michel Gallant" <neutron@NOSPAMistar.ca> wrote in message
    > > >> >news:%23RLDwiL8DHA.3704@tk2msftngp13.phx.gbl...
    > > >> >> Here is a simple walk-through for SNing an assembly and adjusting
    > > >> >> CAS for network-share deployment (similar for Internet
    deployment):
    > > >> >> http://www3.sympatico.ca/mitchg/dotnet/networkshare.html
    > > >> >>
    > > >> >> Also this excellent article on SNing:
    > > >> >>
    > > >>
    > >
    >>http://msdn.microsoft.com/security/default.aspx?pull=/library/en-us/dnnets
    e
    > > >c/html/strongnames.asp
    > > >> >>
    > > >> >> - Michel Gallant
    > > >> >> MVP Security
    > > >> >> JavaScienceConsulting
    > > >> >> http://pages.istar.ca/~neutron
    > > >> >>
    > > >> >> "Mary Chipman" <mchip@nomail.please> wrote in message
    > > >> >> news:lejk201po941d1u9gq1ancsf9cpbq6qn9k@4ax.com...
    > > >> >> > "Creating and Using Strong-Named Assemblies" in the help file is
    as
    > > >> >> > good place as any to start.
    > > >> >> >
    > > >> >> > -- Mary
    > > >> >> > MCW Technologies
    > > >> >> > http://www.mcwtech.com
    > > >> >> >
    > > >> >> > On Tue, 10 Feb 2004 22:32:19 -0600, "Joe Kaplan \(MVP - ADSI\)"
    > > >> >> > <joseph.e.kaplan@removethis.accenture.com> wrote:
    > > >> >> >
    > > >> >> > >The big decision is whether you want to do strong names or
    > > >> >authenticode. If
    > > >> >> > >you go with strong names, you first need to sign all of your
    > > >> >assemblies.
    > > >> >> > >This can be done via the AssemblyKeyName or AssemblyFile
    attributes
    > > >or
    > > >> >via
    > > >> >> > >the sn tool.
    > > >> >> > >
    > > >> >> > >To ensure that your assemblies are only used by code that has
    been
    > > >> >signed by
    > > >> >> > >one of these mechanisms, you create the appropriate permission
    and
    > > >> >Demand
    > > >> >> > >it. You can do this with attributes or in code with permission
    > > >objects
    > > >> >and
    > > >> >> > >the Demand method.
    > > >> >> > >
    > > >> >> > >I don't have a good sample I can point you too, but there is
    likely
    > > >> >someone
    > > >> >> > >else in the forum who might have one or could answer more
    detailed
    > > >> >questions
    > > >> >> > >if you get stuck.
    > > >> >> > >
    > > >> >> > >Joe K.
    > > >> >> > >
    > > >> >> > >"Jonas" <jonas@nospam.pl> wrote in message
    > > >> >> > >news:O9FP0L$7DHA.2412@TK2MSFTNGP09.phx.gbl...
    > > >> >> > >> Can You point us to some info on how to do this step-by-step?
    > > >> >> > >>
    > > >> >> > >> TIA
    > > >> >> > >>
    > > >> >> > >> Jonas
    > > >> >> > >>
    > > >> >> > >> "Joe Kaplan (MVP - ADSI)"
    > > ><joseph.e.kaplan@removethis.accenture.com>
    > > >> >wrote
    > > >> >> > >> in message news:O5C4x%23%237DHA.1052@TK2MSFTNGP12.phx.gbl...
    > > >> >> > >> > Signing your assemblies with a strong name key or
    authenticode
    > > >> >signing
    > > >> >> > >> them,
    > > >> >> > >> > along with using StrongNamePermissionAttribute or
    > > >> >> > >> > PublisherIdentityPermissionAttribute, should allow you to
    make
    > > >> >ensure
    > > >> >> > >that
    > > >> >> > >> > only code signed with the correct key or certificate can
    call
    > > >your
    > > >> >code.
    > > >> >> > >> > This is probably better than trying to implement this
    yourself.
    > > >> >> > >> >
    > > >> >> > >> > Joe K.
    > > >> >> > >> >
    > > >> >> > >> > "steve" <anonymous@discussions.microsoft.com> wrote in
    message
    > > >> >> > >> > news:EAA195F6-8FE3-42AC-8BE3-A5771C5D15DE@microsoft.com...
    > > >> >> > >> > > I have written a dll assembly which I want to make sure
    can
    > > >only
    > > >> >be
    > > >> >> > >> > accessed by applications written by our own company.
    > > >> >> > >> > > Are there any inbuilt mechanisms to achieve this or do I
    have
    > > >to
    > > >> >> > >> implement
    > > >> >> > >> > my own.
    > > >> >> > >> > >
    > > >> >> > >> > > Steve
    > > >> >> > >> >
    > > >> >> > >> >
    > > >> >> > >>
    > > >> >> > >>
    > > >> >> > >
    > > >> >> >
    > > >> >>
    > > >> >>
    > > >> >
    > > >> >
    > > >> >
    > > >>
    > > >>
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > >
    > >
    >
    >

  • Next message: Chris Behrens: "RSA Public / Private Key encryption, RSA.ToXmlString method"

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