Re: [?]Security Basics

From: Jason LaRue (aqdqmqiqnq_at_iqnteluser.no-ip.info)
Date: 06/19/04 

Date: Sat, 19 Jun 2004 19:32:53 GMT

Thor Kottelin <thor@anta.net> wrote in news:40D4932B.23EC9BEA@anta.net:

>
> In order to achieve anonymity, remailers should be chained. Using
> one's own remailer somewhere in that chain ensures that at least one
> remailer - one's own - is trustworthy.
>

I'm still struggling with this. There are three places to put
one's own remailer in the chain: at the beginning, at the middle,
and at the end.

If one's remailer is put at the beginning, the chain looks like
this:

1. one's own email (includes incriminating data)
2. one's own remailer (includes incriminating IP)
3. other remailer (erases own IP)
4. other remailer
5. target

This is not substantially different from

1. one's own email (includes incriminating data)
2. other remailer (erases email)
3. other remailer
4. target

If the first external remailer in the chain is compromised,
your identity is revealed in both cases.

If one's own remailer is but somewhere in the middle, the
chain looks like this:

1. one's own email (includes incriminating data)
2. other remailer (erases email)
3. other remailer
4. one's own remailer (introduces incriminating IP)
5. other remailer (erases IP)
6. other remailer
7. target

Without the remailer,

1. one's own email (includes incriminating data)
2. other remailer (erases email)
3. other remailer
4. target

In the first case, there are two remailers that are privy
to incriminating data, 2 and 5, while there is only one
in the second case.

If one's own remailer is placed at the end, the target
immediately has the sender's IP.

Certainly having one's own remailer means having a trusted
remailer, but it introduces incriminating data itself. I'm
afraid I can't see the advantage; indeed, every case besides
putting one's own remailer at the beginning seems to be
a disadvantage, while in the first case it is simply
irrelevant. Can you explain this to me?

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