SSRT3622 rev. 1 Bind v920
From: Security Alert (secure_at_cup.hp.com)
Date: 02/09/04
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Date: 9 Feb 2004 13:39:29 -0700
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**REVISED 01**
Source: HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
SECURITY BULLETIN: HPSBUX0310-290
Originally issued: 08 October 2003
Last revision: 06 February 2004
SSRT3622 rev. 1 Bind v920
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NOTICE: There are no restrictions for distribution of this
Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact.
The information in the following Security Bulletin should be
acted upon as soon as possible. Hewlett-Packard Company will
not be liable for any consequences to any customer resulting
from customer's failure to fully implement instructions in this
Security Bulletin as soon as possible.
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PROBLEM: 1. Certain ASN.1 encodings that are rejected as invalid
by the parser can trigger a bug in the deallocation
of the corresponding data structure, corrupting the
stack. This can be used as a denial of service
attack. It is currently unknown whether this can be
exploited to run malicious code. This issue does not
affect OpenSSL 0.9.6.
More details are available at:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0545
2. Unusual ASN.1 tag values can cause an out of bounds
read under certain circumstances, resulting in a
denial of service vulnerability.
More details are available at:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0543
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0544
3. A malformed public key in a certificate will crash
the verify code if it is set to ignore public key
decoding errors. Exploitation of an affected
application would result in a denial of service
vulnerability.
4. Due to an error in the SSL/TLS protocol handling,
a server will parse a client certificate when one is
not specifically requested.
IMPACT: Potential Denial of Service
PLATFORM: HP9000 Servers running HP-UX releases B.11.00, B.11.11,
and B.11.22, only with the BINDv920 installed.
**REVISED 01**
SOLUTION: Until a product upgrade is available, download and
install the appropriate depot from the ftp site
(see below).
Bind9.2 for B.11.00 BIND920.11.00.depot
--> Bind9.2 for B.11.11 BINDv920 version 005
Bind9.2 patch for B.11.22 PHNE_29859.depot
**REVISED 01**
MANUAL ACTIONS: Yes - NonUpdate
for B.11.00 use the temporary depot
for B.11.11 download web upgrade
for B.11.22 use the temporary depot
Install the product containing the fix.
AVAILABILITY: The depots or patch are available now, via ftp
(see below).
This bulletin will be updated when a product
upgrade is available.
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A. Background
An SSL/TLS testing suite developed by the NISCC (National
Infrastructure Security Co-Ordination Centre in the UK) has
identified ASN.1 parsing vulnerabilities in OpenSSL.
AFFECTED VERSIONS
The following is a list by HP-UX revision of
affected filesets or patches and fix information.
To determine if a system has an affected version,
search the output of "swlist -a revision -l fileset"
for an affected fileset or patch, then determine if
a fixed revision or applicable patch is installed.
HP-UX B.11.00
=============
BINDv920.INETSVCS-BIND
fix: install revision B.11.00.01.002 from BIND920.11.00.depot
HP-UX B.11.11
=============
BINDv920.INETSVCS-BIND
--> fix: install revision B.11.11.01.005 or subsequent from
<software.hp.com>.
HP-UX B.11.22
=============
InternetSrvcs.INETSVCS2-RUN
fix: install PHNE_29859.depot
END AFFECTED VERSIONS
B. Recommended solution
Note: These fixes should be applied to all systems using
DNS, including those systems with client programs only.
Notes on Bind Versions (B.11.00 and B.11.11)
=============================================
Bind is available on B.11.00 and B.11.11 as part of
the base operating system and as a web upgrade.
Both versions (base os and web upgrade) may be
installed on a system simultaneously. Only one
version can be active. The active version can
be changed via a script.
The base os versions are updated via patches. The
web upgrade versions are updated by installing a
later web upgrade. The web upgrade versions are
not patched, instead are simply newer versions.
If a web upgrade version is active it is not possible
to patch the base os version. It is necessary to
switch to the base os version with the following
command before applying the patch:
/usr/bin/enable_inet -r bind
If you are running a web upgrade version and do not
intend to re-enable the base os version, it is not
necessary to patch the base os version. However,
since the base os version can be re-enabled with
the script, you may want to patch the base os version
even though it is not active. Similarly, if you have
installed a web upgrade version and have switched
back to the base os version, you may want to update
to the latest web upgrade version or use swremove(1)
to remove the web upgrade version entirely.
Identifying the Active Version (B.11.00/B.11.11)
================================================
Execute the following command:
what /usr/sbin/named | grep named
The bind version will be on the named line.
For example:
named 9.2.0 Thu Jul 18 11:58:39 GMT 2002
Identifying the Web Upgrade Version (B.11.00/B.11.11)
=====================================================
If the file /usr/contrib/bind/usr/sbin/named exists,
execute the following:
what /usr/contrib/bind/usr/sbin/named | grep named
The bind version will be on the named line.
If the version is anything other than 9.2.0, this bulletin
does not apply to the system being examined.
Until a product upgrade is available, download and install
install the appropriate depot from the ftp site.
--> 1a). For B.11.00 and B.11.22, download the appropriate
.depot.gz from the ftp site.
(This file is temporary and will be deleted when a
product upgrade is available from itrc.hp.com).
System: hprc.external.hp.com (192.170.19.51)
Login: bind920
Password: bind920
FTP Access: ftp://bind920:bind920@hprc.external.hp.com/
or: ftp://bind920:bind920@192.170.19.51/
or: ftp hprc.external.hp.com
Note: There is an ftp defect in IE5 that may result in
a browser hang. To work around this:
- Select Tools -> Internet Options -> Advanced
- Un-check the option:
[ ] Enable folder view for FTP sites
--> 1b). For B.11.11 download BINDv920 version 005 from web
--> upgrade at: <http://software.hp.com>
==================================================
2. To fix the problem, copy the appropriate depot file to
a protected directory and unpack it.
cksum:
1691634068 8498721 BIND920.11.00.depot.gz
--> 3043026926 8714240 BINDv920 version 005
1640049049 12927378 PHNE_29859.depot.gz
md5:
BIND920.11.00.depot.gz
8AEF8700958CDAE6D50D0FCFE6B30FB6
--> BINDv920 version 005 from <http://software.hp.com>
--> 232DF6E08C2725567731E4BC9498D124
PHNE_29859.depot.gz
0B306B5E4353D157F0120B719D8D38D3
3. Install the appropriate depot using swinstall(1).
C. To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security
Bulletins from the HP IT Resource Center via electronic
mail, do the following:
Use your browser to get to the HP IT Resource Center page
at:
Use the 'Login' tab at the left side of the screen to login
using your ID and password. Use your existing login or the
"Register" button at the left to create a login, in order to
gain access to many areas of the ITRC. Remember to save the
User ID assigned to you, and your password.
In the left most frame select "Maintenance and Support".
Under the "Notifications" section (near the bottom of
the page), select "Support Information Digests".
To -subscribe- to future HP Security Bulletins or other
Technical Digests, click the check box (in the left column)
for the appropriate digest and then click the "Update
Subscriptions" button at the bottom of the page.
or
To -review- bulletins already released, select the link
(in the middle column) for the appropriate digest.
NOTE: Using your itrc account security bulletins can be
found here:
http://itrc.hp.com/cki/bin/doc.pl/screen=ckiSecurityBulletin
To -gain access- to the Security Patch Matrix, select
the link for "The Security Bulletins Archive". (near the
bottom of the page) Once in the archive the third link is
to the current Security Patch Matrix. Updated daily, this
matrix categorizes security patches by platform/OS release,
and by bulletin topic. Security Patch Check completely
automates the process of reviewing the patch matrix for
11.XX systems. Please note that installing the patches
listed in the Security Patch Matrix will completely
implement a security bulletin _only_ if the MANUAL ACTIONS
field specifies "No."
The Security Patch Check tool can verify that a security
bulletin has been implemented on HP-UX 11.XX systems providing
that the fix is completely implemented in a patch with no
manual actions required. The Security Patch Check tool cannot
verify fixes implemented via a product upgrade.
For information on the Security Patch Check tool, see:
http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/cgi/
displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA
The security patch matrix is also available via anonymous
ftp:
ftp://ftp.itrc.hp.com/export/patches/hp-ux_patch_matrix/
On the "Support Information Digest Main" page:
click on the "HP Security Bulletin Archive".
The PGP key used to sign this bulletin is available from
several PGP Public Key servers. The key identification
information is:
2D2A7D59
HP Security Response Team (Security Bulletin signing only)
<security-alert@hp.com>
Fingerprint =
6002 6019 BFC1 BC62 F079 862E E01F 3AFC 2D2A 7D59
If you have problems locating the key please write to
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by sending 'get key' to security-alert@hp.com.
D. To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to
security-alert@hp.com
Please encrypt any exploit information using the
security-alert PGP key, available from your local key
server, or by sending a message with a -subject- (not body)
of 'get key' (no quotes) to security-alert@hp.com.
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(c)Copyright 2003 Hewlett-Packard Company
Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or
editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information
in this document is subject to change without notice.
Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of HP products referenced
herein are trademarks and/or service marks of Hewlett-Packard
Company. Other product and company names mentioned herein may be
trademarks and/or service marks of their respective owners.
________________________________________________________________
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-- Yours truly, HP S/W Security Team WTEC Cupertino, California Return-Path: secure@cup.hp.com Reply-to: security-alert@hp.com
- Next message: Nick Owen: "Re: Methods of Authentication on a Corporate"
- Previous message: Spider: "Re: JSP 440"
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